

CURRENT HISTORY

A WORLD AFFAIRS JOURNAL



THE SOVIET UNION, 1991

Assessing the Coup	<i>Jerry F. Hough</i>	305
The Bush Administration's Policy toward the Soviet Union	<i>Raymond L. Garthoff</i>	311
Soviet Foreign Policy after the Cold War	<i>Mark Kramer</i>	317
A Critical Time for Perestroika	<i>Gertrude E. Schroeder</i>	323
The Revival of Religion	<i>David E. Powell</i>	328
Environmental Problems and Policies in the Soviet Union	<i>Hilary F. French</i>	333
The Slide into Disunion	<i>Martha Brill Olcott</i>	338

Book Reviews	<i>On the Soviet Union</i>	345
The Month in Review	<i>Country by Country, Day by Day</i>	347



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EDITOR'S NOTE:

The Soviet Union captured world attention in mid-August when hard-liners ousted Mikhail Gorbachev and, for three days, tried to reimpose the old order. The reasons for their failure are as varied as the reasons for the coup itself, and, as Jerry Hough points out in the lead article, "it will be a long time before even the simplest facts about the event. . . are clear."

What is clear are the issues that dominated discussions before the coup. Martha Brill Olcott reviews the nationalities question and, in her view, Gorbachev's mishandling of the issue. The Bush administration's policy toward the Soviet Union is examined by Raymond Garthoff, who charts the course of US-Soviet ties from President Bush's initially cool relationship with Gorbachev to his warm support of the Soviet president and his reforms.

Other articles discuss the dismal performance of the Soviet economy and the reform program, the country's environmental morass, and the reemergence of religion as one of the fruits of glasnost.

A special note: Our regular Month in Review includes an extensive chronology of the coup attempt and the events that followed.

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The August coup attempt and its fallout have altered the Soviet Union's political landscape. However, amid the euphoria surrounding Baltic independence and the demise of the Communist party stand the dangers of civil war and a military response. "[W]e need to remember what Gorbachev said in his speech to the Russian parliament [after the coup attempt]: Three planeloads of airborne troops are enough to overthrow any Soviet government. On the surface, it was a statement of thanks to the commander of the troops for not supporting the coup. It was also an apparent warning about the future. No country's military will permit bloody disintegration if it has the ability to stop it, and the Soviet military...is willing to initiate the bloodshed to stop the disintegration."

Assessing the Coup

BY JERRY F. HOUGH

RECEIVED

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The August coup attempt in the Soviet Union and its aftermath surprised everyone. Those of us who thought that the traditional hard-liners were too weak to stage a coup were surprised that they dared. Those who correctly predicted a right-wing coup by the military and the KGB were surprised by the impotence and sheer incompetence of the latter. (Indeed, the level of incompetence was a surprise to everyone.) And those who thought that a coup would give way to rule by a democratic Boris Yeltsin, the popularly elected president of the Russian republic, were deeply disturbed by his authoritarian actions and his threats to invade other republics in the days after the coup failed.

It will be a long time before the simplest facts about the events of August are clear. Given the strong attraction Soviet citizens have for conspiracy theories, no explanation will ever be entirely satisfactory, and the number of theories will outpace those on the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. We cannot do more now than begin to sort out some of the main issues surrounding the coup attempt and its aftermath.

WHOSE COUP WAS IT?

From the moment the coup was televised, it appeared most peculiar. First, it was odd that it could be seen on television—that satellite connections had not

been cut, and that Soviet television stations and newspapers had not been seized. But, even more peculiar, why had the radicals not been arrested in the dawn hours before the tanks rolled (President Mikhail Gorbachev had been under house arrest at his dacha in the Crimea since 5:00 P.M. the previous evening), and why were tanks meandering through the streets of Moscow, which otherwise seemed rather normal?

Another oddity. One of the coup leaders, KGB chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov, had served with General Secretary Yuri Andropov in the Hungarian embassy in 1956 when Soviet forces crushed the Hungarian revolution. He was head of Soviet foreign intelligence when General Wojciech Jaruzelski efficiently imposed martial law in Poland in 1981 (beginning with the arrest of the leaders of the Solidarity trade union). Moreover, from his years heading foreign intelligence, he should have known something about how successful coups are organized in Africa and Latin America. What in heaven's name was going through his mind?

But perhaps the coup attempt was not what it seemed to be on the surface. Perhaps the eight members of the "State of Emergency Committee" never intended to do more than introduce some order and the kind of partial reform found in Janos Kadar's Hungary (significant reform in agriculture and public services, but relatively little in industry), together with a smoothly functioning federal system. This would not be surprising, since Soviet conservatives have not been as reactionary as the radicals have claimed. It is a long way on the political spectrum from complete reaction to com-

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plete adoption of a Western political and economic system, and the coup leaders may have been somewhat closer to the political center than it appeared. They may have seen themselves as sufficiently centrist to maintain control easily.

The hard-liners apparently timed their coup to precede the signing of the union treaty but to follow the summit between President George Bush and Gorbachev and the signing of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). They proclaimed their acceptance of treaties with Germany and agreements on conventional arms control, which suggests that they were not very disturbed by Gorbachev's foreign policy. (The coup leaders certainly would have been foolish to give up the fruits of Gorbachev's policy when the price in Germany and Eastern Europe had already been irrevocably paid.) Perhaps they thought that if they allowed the media to remain relatively free and caused little bloodshed then the West would be willing to establish relations with them. Maybe they even thought they could persuade Gorbachev or Yeltsin to head a new regime (At a press conference during the coup, Vice President Gennadi Yanayev, the formal leader of the coup attempt, suggested that Gorbachev could return once he had recovered from his "illness.")

But if so, a hundred questions follow, none of which has an easy or particularly credible answer. In general, it was a dumb coup attempt conducted by some rather lackluster people who did not think two or three moves ahead and who did not present the Soviet people with a minimally attractive program. They promised little more than law and order, yet could not even organize an orderly takeover of the government.

The coup's implausibility has fueled conspiracy theories, but these theories make less sense than straightforward explanations. Surely the men now in jail—or dead—would not have risked their positions and freedom in order to serve as sacrificial lambs for someone like Gorbachev or Yeltsin, as some have speculated. And neither Gorbachev nor Yeltsin would have dared enter into a conspiracy that would have left them vulnerable to blackmail or exposure.

WHY DID THE COUP FAIL?

If the coup was as foolish as it appeared, then the question is not why it failed, but rather why it failed so quickly. This, however, is a question that must be considered carefully. If we misjudge what happened the week of the coup attempt, we may profoundly misunderstand the strength of the various Soviet actors.

The media gave the American public an extremely misleading impression of the coup. American television cameras happened to be in the one place where dra-

matic events were unfolding—the Russian parliament—and Americans saw the coup and its collapse from that camera angle. Moreover, because of the location of the camera, the American public became prisoners of the "spin" that the radicals at the parliament put on the news. It also helped that events moved according to the script of a television miniseries: the length was about right and the good guys won because of people power and its representative, Boris Yeltsin.

But televised reality had only the most marginal relationship to the truth. The Russian public did not support Yeltsin's call for a general strike and, as even the American television correspondents noted, the demonstrations in Moscow and Leningrad against the coup were pitifully small. It would have been a simple task for troops to seize Yeltsin and his supporters holding out in the Russian parliament. Three planeloads of airborne troops, as Gorbachev later pointedly said, would have been enough.

The decisive factor in the failure of the coup was a division in the military. As Stephen Meyer, director of Soviet security studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology told *The Washington Post*, "most of [the military commanders] sat it out. The truth is, if the army had played in any serious way, they would still be in control."¹

The divisions in the military were to some extent based on personal or factional conflicts. A commentator on Russian radio noted on July 8 that the leaders of the Ministry of Defense constituted a "clan...made up of Far Easterners. They are all connected by friendships formed in the Far East. Its members are Marshal [Dimitri] Yazov, Army General [Valentin] Varennikov, Army General [Konstantin] Kochetov, Army General [Petr] Lushev, and Army General [Mikhail] Moiseyev." Other members of the military leadership clearly could have felt left out.

But to a far greater degree the divisions in the military were generational and based on fundamental differences about the national interests of the Soviet Union and the prerequisites for stability. Much of the early American analysis referred to the takeover as a Brezhnevite-Pinochet military coup, but that description had to be wrong because President Leonid Brezhnev and Chilean General Augusto Pinochet carried out totally different programs: Brezhnev opposed the market and integration with the world economy, while Pinochet ruthlessly suppressed political opponents of the market in order to introduce radical marketization in Chile and fully integrate the country's economy into the world economy.

The Soviet Union does have a Brezhnevite military—a military that looks to the past—which is represented by men like Defense Minister Yazov. But the Soviet Union also has a Pinochet-like military—a military that looks to the future—which is represented by

¹*The Washington Post*, August 18, 1991.

the new minister of defense, Yevgeny Shaposhnikov. Unlike in 1917, the Soviet military did not dissolve in this coup. Instead, the military of the future defeated the military of the past. Anyone who forgets this is likely to be surprised by the course of future events.

THE MILITARY OF THE PAST

The more traditional members of the Soviet military, who tend to be older, look to the past. For centuries, Russia had to contend with threatening powers to the west. The Teutonic Knights in the thirteenth century, the Swedes, the Lithuanians, the Poles, Napoleon, Kaiser Wilhelm, Hitler—all had put Russia in grave danger. As a result the Russian military's attention focused on a secure border with Europe.

Yazov and Gorbachev's top military adviser, Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev (who committed suicide the week after the coup), had been 18-year-olds when the Soviet Union was invaded by Germany in 1941, and had served as officers at the front. KGB chairman Kryuchkov, who was 17 in 1941, spent the war engaged in political work in the defense industry. From the point of view of these traditional members of the military, Gorbachev had given up the gains of World War II. He had permitted the reunification of Germany and abandoned the buffer zone in Eastern Europe. He had surrendered and even betrayed third world allies such as Iraq and Ethiopia. If Soviet geostrategic interests were the same as they had been in the past, then the coup leaders were justified in saying that Gorbachev was a traitor.

In addition, those who looked to the past remembered that the Soviet Union had been stable for decades, with a "social contract" that gave the Soviet people job security, subsidized prices, income egalitarianism, and law and order. When Gorbachev allowed greater freedom and democracy, the result was instability and chaos. The military of the past concluded that in staging a coup, it could suppress democracy, and the public would support it. When Vice President Yanayev was asked if he were not a commander without troops, he answered, "the people demand that elementary order in the country be established." Yanayev was quite right, but the question was what kind of order they demanded, and from whom.

THE MILITARY OF THE FUTURE AND MAINTAINING STABILITY

Yanayev forgot that in revolutionary times "the people" comprise more than one group. Revolutions are always made by young men between the ages of 15 and 22, since they are the only group that will stand up to tanks and troops. Revolutions fail, however, if the army continues to fire at demonstrators. But if the young men in the army—who are also in their teens and early twenties—strongly sympathize with those in the

streets, they may not fire on them. If so, the army will dissolve almost immediately, as it did in 1917.

There are no absolute rules on the behavior of troops in revolutions, but there are tendencies. In general, talented, intelligent, and ambitious young men are more dangerous than youths without ability or ambition. One of the reasons Communist regimes remained stable for so many decades is that their political and economic program was attractive to the largest group of upwardly mobile youth in the early stages of industrialization—the mass of peasants moving to the city, who were frightened by the insecurity of their new life and hostile to the secular and Westernizing elite they encountered.

The new Soviet military understands that industrialization fundamentally changes social structure. As the number of peasants in a country declines, the largest group of talented, upwardly mobile youth are urban workers who want to become part of the middle class. This is what is happening in the Soviet Union today. Polls show that those under 35 have strongly supported economic reform, while those over 55 have greatly feared it. Ambitious Soviet citizens in their teens and twenties want to open their own businesses and have the chance to become rich. This is also true of young military draftees, who will return to civilian life in a year or two.

If the coup leaders had proclaimed a Pinochet-like policy of suppressing political unrest that interfered with economic reform, then the military of the future might well have supported them. But when the coup leaders spoke as if they were supporting the old social contract that benefited older workers, the new military must have felt that, sooner or later, major demonstrations would occur that the soldiers could not be trusted to suppress. Memories of Romania in 1989 no doubt began to haunt them.

Those generals who looked to the past saw a deteriorating Soviet position with respect to a potential threat from Europe. But when younger generals looked seriously at the future, they saw a world in which the Soviet Union's geostrategic interests had changed. The postwar world had seen the end of the historic conflicts between England, France, and Germany, and the creation of a "common European home"—what the United States called the Atlantic community—from the Elbe River to California. Six hundred million Europeans had learned to live together in peace.

To an extent that the United States has not appreciated, this development fundamentally changed Soviet geostrategic interests. For the first time in centuries, Russia no longer faced a threat from Europe. But history has not ended. Any thinking person knows that China and India, each with a population of around one billion and each industrializing rapidly, will become superpowers sometime in the twenty-first century. Both

border the Soviet Union, and China has large territorial claims on the Soviet Union. If a ruler like the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini or Saddam Hussein came to power in China or India, or even in countries like Pakistan and Indonesia, the Soviet Union would feel threatened. Given the enormous economic, ethnic, political, and social problems in Asia, no one should be confident that the twenty-first century will proceed smoothly in that part of the world.

In this new situation, Soviet geostrategic interests and future defense programs are clear-cut. The Soviet Union must deemphasize the weapons of the twentieth century such as tanks and artillery, and reform its electronics and computer industries so it can develop twenty-first-century weaponry like smart bombs, strategic defense, and other high-technology arms.

Since Soviet autarky created a protectionism that sapped the country's technological vitality, integration into the world economy is indispensable for the transformation of high-technology industries. This was impossible if the West still feared the Soviet Union. In addition, if the country's future threats were China and India with their huge populations, then the Soviet Union with only 300 million people needed allies. An alliance with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was the right move for any Soviet military commander looking to the twenty-first century, since that would create a defense community of one billion people, stretching—in the words of United States Secretary of State James Baker 3d—"from Vladivostok to Vancouver."

Even one of the apparent supporters of the coup, the head of the Soviet General Staff, General Moiseyev, went on American television in 1989 and again in 1991 to endorse the Soviet Union's return to its World War II relationship with the United States. Both the chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1989, Admiral William Crowe, and the present chairman, General Colin Powell, were convinced of Moiseyev's sincerity.

As Stephen Meyer has noted, Defense Minister Shaposhnikov, who is 49 years old and who became commander of the air force only in July 1990, has been very vocal about the need for economic reform and a market economy. His opposition to the coup surely shows that he understood its success would have disrupted integration into the world economy and alliance with the West.

²Remarks made by Yeltsin during a televised "town meeting" call-in program that also included Gorbachev. Excerpts are in *The New York Times*, September 7, 1991.

³Indeed, Tiraspol shut off supplies to the rest of Moldavia to protest the arrest of a Russian deputy to the Moldavian legislature.

THE SECOND COUP ATTEMPT

If the hard-line coup attempt was puzzling, then the events of the subsequent two weeks seemed downright surrealistic. Shortly before the coup attempt, Yeltsin had apparently adopted a more cooperative posture toward Gorbachev, and during the three days the hard-liners were in power he stated that he was fighting for Gorbachev's restoration as president. Then in the week after the end of the coup Yeltsin seemed absolutely determined to reinforce the fears of those who saw a fascist side to him. The leader of the Russian republic acted as if he thought he were in a position to force Gorbachev from power in the short run; indeed, he later told ABC newsman Ted Koppel that he believed Gorbachev could not remain president.²

After his return to Moscow, Gorbachev—only two days out of a harrowing house arrest—paid Yeltsin the honor of a visit to his provincial parliament in order to thank him for his support during the coup. Yeltsin, however, behaved in the most insulting, boorish manner imaginable. He interrupted and hectorated. He shook his finger at Gorbachev, forcing him to read aloud on television an informal (and perhaps inaccurate) report about the first post-coup Cabinet session.

Yeltsin suggested that he had the right to select the country's prime minister, defense minister, police ministers, and those who would hold other ministerial posts. He demanded before the television cameras that Gorbachev recognize his decrees during the coup, including those giving the Russian republic control of all military units (presumably including those manning nuclear weapons) in the Russian republic! (While Yeltsin was insisting on this, his foreign policy adviser, Georgi Arbatov, could be seen in the audience shaking his head negatively.) More remarkably, without consulting his legislature, Yeltsin issued unconstitutional decrees to outlaw the Communist party in the republic and to close several Communist party newspapers, including *Pravda*—dramatically signing the decrees in Gorbachev's presence on live television.

The flow of unconstitutional decrees from the Russian republic continued, as did the high-handed and illegal harassment of political opponents. When the Ukraine and Kazakhstan joined the string of republics that had declared their independence in the days after the coup attempt, Yeltsin's official spokesman stated that if the two seceded, Russia would seize the huge, predominantly Russian-speaking areas of those republics. This was a threat that had immense implications, especially for the small republics. The city of Narva in Estonia is nearly 95 percent Russian, and Kokhtla-Yarve approximately 80 percent; the Lithuanian port of Klaipėda is 70 percent Russian; and key cities in Moldavia such as Tiraspol are predominantly Russian and Ukrainian.³ Even Riga, the capital of Latvia, is only 36 percent Latvian.

Former Yeltsin supporters, such as Anatoly Sobchak, the mayor of Leningrad, and Serge Stankevich, the deputy mayor of Moscow, warned against Yeltsin's excesses. Intellectuals backed away in fright from the Russian president, and the republics that declared independence did so partly in response to Yeltsin's actions. But as the republics came to understand that a close relationship with each other was going to be necessary for some time, they turned to Gorbachev and the need for a fairly strong central government to counterbalance the Russian republic.

The session of the Congress of People's Deputies held during the first week of September was seriously misunderstood. On the surface its decisions gave power to the republics, but in fact power flowed to Mikhail Gorbachev. Power was vested in a new Soviet State Council composed of the Soviet Union's president and the leaders of the union republics. The formal recognition of Baltic independence that same week left 12 republics, 6 of which were Muslim republics, fully under Gorbachev's control (the 6, which include Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and the 4 Central Asian republics, dislike Yeltsin, who has publicly adopted a scornful and even racist attitude toward them).

The decisions of the council are mandatory, and its work is "directed" by the president. The same is true of an Interrepublic Economic Council that will coordinate the economy. A reconstituted Supreme Soviet will leave Yeltsin even weaker than he was before the coup. The new transitional government was, in the words of one deputy, "a presidential putsch" by Gorbachev. Of course, if decrees from the transitional government are not followed, then they mean nothing. But how can Yeltsin continue his war of laws with winter and economic hardship coming and with foreign investment dependent on legal order?⁴

The most likely explanation for the flow of events in August and early September is that Gorbachev, for all his miscalculations (especially about Defense Minister Yazov), correctly understands the values and interests of the military of the future. The explanation for the defeat of the first coup—the resistance of the military of the future—is also the explanation for the defeat of the Yeltsin coup. The military of the future does not want a breakup of the Soviet Union, especially if it means that the values of populism or even fascism are dominant.

THE BREAKUP OF THE UNION?

Soviet nationality policy under Gorbachev has been

extremely difficult to understand. An examination of how it has developed must begin with decisions that Gorbachev made in 1988. Celebrations commemorating the 1,000th anniversary of the introduction of Christianity into Russia were scheduled for the summer of that year, and Gorbachev wanted Pope John Paul II to attend the ceremonies in Moscow. The pope was willing to make the trip, but insisted on visiting Catholic Lithuania. Gorbachev refused, clearly fearing that the pope's visit would destabilize the Baltic republic.

In July, Gorbachev allowed the Baltic republics to form non-Communist parties, to discuss openly the Hitler-Stalin Pact (the treaty that annexed the Baltics to the Soviet Union in 1940), and to hold free elections, which gave politicians every incentive to let extremism guide their speech. Some observers think Gorbachev was surprised that extremism emerged, but his behavior in his negotiations with the pope does not suggest this. Some think that if Gorbachev had made sufficient concessions to the Baltics he could have solved all his problems there, but this analysis neglects both the inevitable tendency of revolutions to radicalize and the impossibility of giving the republics real independence without the most thorough economic reform, which would take years to introduce.

Most analysts have not understood two other major political problems Gorbachev has faced. First, more than 60 percent of the Russian people have attained high school or more advanced educations—well above the level at which people demand democracy. Traditionally the Communist party had legitimized itself with the argument that it was holding the country together, and clearly Mikhail Gorbachev was determined to associate himself with national unity in order to maintain support during the difficult economic times to come.

Second, the general secretary was elected and could be removed by the Central Committee of the Communist party—a body of some 300 of the country's top central and regional officials. The Central Committee had removed Nikita Khrushchev as general secretary in 1964, and Brezhnev had been extremely accommodating to the top elite in an apparent effort to preclude Central Committee action. If Gorbachev wanted to introduce revolutionary reforms that involved a major turnover of officials, he had a potential problem with the Central Committee's power to remove him.

A great deal of Gorbachev's policy in the republics was shaped by these two factors. Gorbachev had to transfer his base of power from the Central Committee to a state post (that is, the presidency), and he needed unrest in the non-Russian areas to rally Russians around himself as the guarantor of national unity.⁵

In retrospect, the Soviet leader's one major mistake was his decision to create a new union treaty instead of

⁴Decrees from the center will encounter greater problems in the Ukraine, but in the short run Ukrainian leaders will face the same problems that may constrain Yeltsin.

⁵For a fuller discussion of this point, see Jerry F. Hough, "The Politics of Successful Economic Reform," *Soviet Economy*, vol. 5, no. 1 (January–March 1989).

simply reworking the constitution. A top official involved in the decision said in an interview in 1990 that it was assumed that Russia, the Ukraine, and Byelorussia would go along with a union treaty and that the smaller republics would pose no problem. Then, he said in despair, Russia and the Ukraine started to posture, which opened a can of worms.

Even now we must be careful in judging what is happening. The union republics have had ministries of foreign affairs since 1944, and they officially were so sovereign that the Ukraine and Byelorussia were admitted to the United Nations in 1945 under memberships separate from the Soviet Union's. The union treaty was always based on the assumption that the republics were independent enough to enter into a treaty; hence the declarations of independence that the republics have made only create the conditions that the union treaty always assumed.

Much is now said about the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the establishment of a confederation. Yet if there is a central army, a common foreign policy, a common market and currency, a single federal reserve, and other common institutions, then there are only two things lacking for a genuine federation: a reliable source of central financing and a supreme court to protect individual freedom from majorities in the republics.

The ethnic diversity of the republics must be kept in mind in discussing the country's possible disintegration. If Estonia can have self-determination, why not the Russian cities of Narva and Kokhtla-Yarve in northern Estonia? These two cities had already threatened to declare independence before the coup. Lithuania has denounced the Hitler-Stalin Pact as a crime, yet the pact gave it the predominantly Polish city of Vilno (now

Vilnius) and surrounding rural areas. Tiraspol is just one of the Russian-Ukrainian cities in Moldavia that have threatened to secede, as have the Bulgarian and Gagauz areas.

When the Russian republic and Lithuania signed a treaty recently, Russians in Lithuania retained the right to remain Russian citizens, with the implied right to Russian protection. When Yeltsin threatened to intervene to annex predominantly Russian-speaking areas in the Ukraine and Kazakhstan, he was acting in an undiplomatic manner, but he was also expressing a self-evident truth about what will happen when people start killing each other. The bloodshed seen in Yugoslavia is a miniature illustration of what is possible in the Soviet Union. But because the people in the Soviet Union have a sense of the abyss that lies before them, it is likely that they will pull back and accept the kind of supreme court that will turn the Soviet Union or most of it into a real federation. Even the newly independent Baltic republics may find an arrangement like the one the Åland Islands have with Finland more attractive than they admit to at present.

If people in the various parts of the Soviet Union do not pull back, we need to remember what Gorbachev said in his speech to the Russian parliament: Three planeloads of airborne troops are enough to overthrow any Soviet government. On the surface, it was a statement of thanks to the commander of the airborne troops for not supporting the coup. It was also an apparent warning about the future. No country's military will permit bloody disintegration if it has the ability to stop it, and the Soviet military, like the armed forces in most countries, is willing to initiate the bloodshed to stop the disintegration. ■

"In its first two and a half years, the [Bush] administration has placed United States relations with the Soviet Union on a more solid basis than they have been in many years. The Soviet contribution to this has been essential, perhaps even primary. Nonetheless, even if reactive, the Bush administration has risen to the challenge."

The Bush Administration's Policy toward the Soviet Union

BY RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF

Three days after his inauguration on January 20, 1989, President George Bush telephoned Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev to thank the Soviet leader for his message of congratulation and to reassure him that the new administration would continue to broaden cooperation between their two countries. Gorbachev may not have needed the reassurance then as much as he would need it several months later, when the Bush administration still had not taken any new steps toward developing relations. While Bush did not oppose better relations, he believed that President Ronald Reagan, if initially too bellicose, had become overly enthusiastic about his new relationship with Gorbachev. Bush preferred to cool the ardor and slow the tempo of the relationship while reevaluating the situation.

FROM STATUS QUO MINUS TO STATUS QUO PLUS

The first serious high-level discussion between the United States and the Soviet Union did not take place until Secretary of State James Baker 3d visited Moscow on May 10 and 11. By that time even Reagan had joined many observers in Washington and Moscow who had become restless over when—or even whether—Bush was going to pick up the ball. Finally, on May 12 Bush gave a speech at Texas A & M University unveiling the results of his administration's four-month-long review of policy toward the Soviet Union. While unobjectionable in its restatement of long-familiar American objectives, and in retrospect more prescient than even its

authors knew ("we are approaching the conclusion of an historic postwar struggle between two visions"), it was embarrassingly thin on initiatives or even on an agenda for United States–Soviet relations. Its most concrete proposal was a revived "Open Skies" plan for reciprocal aerial reconnaissance overflights first proposed by President Dwight Eisenhower in 1955. Even that was couched as a challenge to Moscow (to "reveal [the Soviet leadership's] commitment to change"), as were other hortatory calls for unilateral Soviet change—to "tear down the Iron Curtain," to "reduce Soviet forces," and to permit emigration.

All these and more would occur in an astonishingly short time, but not because of any program identified in the speech or pursued in United States policy. The most successful new theme introduced by the speech was the need to move "beyond containment." But this remained for the time being only the articulation of an aspiration.

In other public appearances Bush remained ambivalent and guarded. He emphasized an "obligation to temper optimism with prudence," while endorsing perestroika (economic restructuring) in the Soviet Union. He affirmed that "our policy is to seize every—and I mean every—opportunity to build a better, more stable relationship with the Soviet Union," although, ever prudent, the president reaffirmed in the same sentence that, "it is [also] our policy to defend American interests in light of the enduring reality of Soviet military power."

Even some administration members characterized the new policy as "status quo plus," and although that was better than the status quo minus of the first four months, it was not enough. Bush himself, by now dissatisfied with the anodyne results of his administration's grand review of policy, spurred preparations for an initiative to reduce military forces in Europe that

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was unveiled on May 29 in Brussels.¹ The initiative, the first of any consequence by the Bush administration, was well received in Europe, and the Soviet Union.

Bush visited Poland and Hungary in July; this trip made him more aware of the historic changes stirring there with Gorbachev's acquiescence and even encouragement. Even before he returned to Washington, Bush had decided that it was time to propose a summit meeting with Gorbachev. Baker began negotiations toward a summit in several meetings with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, initiating a diplomatic contact that would grow in intensity. Baker would meet with Shevardnadze 6 times in 1989 and 19 in 1990. But in the summer of 1989 this was still a tentative process.²

Other aspects of the relationship slowly normalized. The United States had put the strategic arms reduction treaty (START) talks on hold, and only during Baker's May visit to Moscow was it agreed to resume the talks in Geneva in mid-June. Notwithstanding the favorable thrust of some of Bush's speeches, there were counterpoints in his own cautions and reservations, and in other administration voices. Thus, while Bush had welcomed and expressed support for Gorbachev's perestroika, on May 16 his own press spokesman, Marlin Fitzwater, had reacted to a genuinely positive Soviet move—Gorbachev's announcement that the Soviet Union would no longer supply arms to Nicaragua—with the comment that it was a gesture by a "drugstore cowboy." Earlier, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney had publicly predicted Gorbachev's reforms would fail. In September, Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger said it was not "the task of American foreign policy" to ensure the success of Gorbachev's reforms.

Nonetheless, Bush was serious about relations with the Soviet Union. He met with Shevardnadze at the White House on September 21, although the key talks were those between Shevardnadze and Baker on the following two days. Baker had invited Shevardnadze to a location near his Wyoming ranch at Jackson Lake in

the Grand Tetons. This meeting, and especially the long plane ride from Washington, gave the two men the opportunity for a long conversation that was probably decisive in persuading Baker that Shevardnadze and Gorbachev were "for real," and that it was in the interest of the United States to support them. The Wyoming meeting led to substantive negotiations on START and nuclear testing, a Soviet commitment to dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar station (built in a location not in accordance with the Anti-Ballistic Missile [ABM] Treaty), and an agreement to announce a summit in Washington for May–June 1990.

The administration also began quietly negotiating for an earlier, less formal summit meeting. This plan was given impetus by the rapid changes in Eastern Europe during the summer and fall of 1989. Bush initially reacted to the developments in Eastern Europe with remarkable reserve, and he seemed almost too restrained in his response to the dramatic opening of the Berlin Wall on November 9, which had been the visible symbol of the division of Europe as well as Germany. But Bush recognized that the changes in Europe now truly called for moving "beyond containment," and not only in rhetoric.

BEYOND CONTAINMENT: THE MALTA SUMMIT

On October 31 it was announced in Washington and Moscow that Bush and Gorbachev would meet off the coast of Malta on warships from their two countries on December 2 and 3, 1989. Described by Bush as an "informal meeting in the interim before the real summit in June [1990]," the meeting at Malta in fact marked an important step in developing closer United States–Soviet relations.³

Gorbachev had been impatient, and some of his advisers concerned, over the cool attitude of the initial months of the Bush administration. At the summit he wanted to resume a dialogue as soon as possible. While a meeting would revalidate Gorbachev's policy toward the United States and would be politically useful at home, its principal purpose from his standpoint was to engage Bush personally and to restore momentum to the process of normalizing and improving relations with the United States.

The meeting was a success for both Bush and Gorbachev. Their global and domestic stature was enhanced by it. Moreover, the two leaders placed superpower relations on a more even keel than they had been for a long time. In historical perspective the Malta meeting symbolically represented the end of the postwar era. It may be seen as the first meeting to look ahead to a new relationship between East and West, a new Europe, and in some respects, a new world. While the Malta summit itself did not end the cold war, it took place at a time when a long-maturing process of change had reached a point where prospects for future cooper-

¹"Remarks Announcing a Conventional Arms Control Initiative... Brussels, Belgium, May 29, 1989," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, vol. 25, no. 22 (June 5, 1989), pp. 781–786.

²Two excellent complementary studies published recently provide a wealth of data and perceptive observations on the United States–Soviet high-level diplomatic exchanges of 1989–1990, including the summit meetings. See Joseph G. Whelan, *Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior—1988–90: Gorbachev-Reagan-Bush Meetings at the Summit*, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, prepared for the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1991); and Don Oberdorfer, *The Turn: From the Cold War to a New Era* (New York: Poseidon Press, 1991).

³This discussion of the Malta summit draws on Raymond L. Garthoff, "The Mediterranean Summit," in *Mediterranean Quarterly*, vol. 1, no. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 14–24.

ation could outweigh continuing competition.

For all its symbolic significance, Malta was in some respects the "interim meeting" originally called for by Bush. No agreements were concluded or even negotiated. Yet the meeting provided not only for a useful exchange of views but also for a joint resolve to press ahead in the START talks, toward an interim United States-Soviet agreement to reduce sharply arsenals of chemical weapons, and, of course, toward a Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) arms reduction agreement.

The president used the occasion to advance bilateral economic relations "beyond containment." He offered steps to normalize trade relations through the prospective granting of most-favored-nation status. He also promised to seek removal of congressional limits to credits. More broadly, Bush said he would support Soviet observer status in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), thus helping to bring the Soviet Union into the world economic structure. As Gorbachev put it, their discussion provided "a political impetus that had been lacking for our economic cooperation to gain momentum." He was clearly pleased and reaffirmed the Soviet effort "to turn our economy sharply toward cooperation with other countries, so that it would be part and parcel of the world economic system."

The most controversial subject at the Malta talks was "regional conflicts," especially the arms sent from Nicaragua to the leftist guerrillas in El Salvador. But the differences in the two leaders' views were also limited. Gorbachev agreed with Bush on allowing free presidential elections in Nicaragua, on opposing the transfer of arms to the Salvadoran rebels, and on resolving conflicts in the region by political means. Two months later, when the ruling Sandinistas lost the election in Nicaragua, the Soviet Union supported the transition.

For an interim summit a good deal was accomplished. But the most important direct result was the establishment of a confident dialogue between the two men. The Malta summit did for Presidents Bush and Gorbachev what the air flight to Wyoming did for Baker and Shevardnadze—provide an opportunity to establish genuine mutual respect and confidence.

One example of the new understanding occurred after Gorbachev privately complained about Bush's repeated references to the developments in Eastern Europe as a triumph for "Western" democratic values; Gorbachev said these were shared universal values that the Soviet Union was now affirming. Bush had not realized such a distinction, and that his wording conveyed an unintended invidious and politically difficult connotation from a Soviet perspective.

En route home from the summit, the president met with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies in Brussels. There Bush referred to the need to end the

division of Europe and of Germany in accordance with "the values that are becoming universal ideals." In his New Year's greetings to the Soviet people a few weeks later, he again referred to democratic and human (rather than Western) values. He also emphasized that Gorbachev's response to the situation in Eastern Europe, his acceptance of peaceful change, and his readiness to accept disproportionately larger conventional arms reductions in Europe "deserved" and indeed "mandated" new thinking on the part of the West.

BEYOND THE COLD WAR: ENDING EUROPE'S DIVISION

During 1990, the Bush administration refocused United States policy to move "beyond the cold war." In the wake of the revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe, the problems of the reunification of Germany and redefining European security came to the fore.

Bush and Gorbachev had not addressed at Malta, nor did they directly at the summit in Washington six months later, the major new issue of European security in a post-cold war world. Gorbachev still spoke of the "reality" of the existence of two German states as a "decision of history," although he also said that "history decides" the fate of Europe and the German states. He stressed the need to avoid "an artificial acceleration" of the process, but did not say change was impossible.

For Bush and Baker, the key to future security and the development of East-West relations was German reunification, with Germany remaining in NATO. As 1990 began, attaining that objective was by no means assured. Growing German interest in reunification might have proved stronger than retaining West German ties to NATO if the Soviet Union had made German withdrawal from NATO the price for Soviet acceptance of a unified Germany.

In the Soviet Union a strong current of concern arose over the drift of Eastern Europe away from the socialist commonwealth, creating for the first time political opposition to Gorbachev's foreign policy based on "new thinking." The rapidly emerging prospect of the absorption of German Democratic Republic by the Federal Republic of Germany was ominous enough in political and economic terms. If a unified Germany also remained in NATO, the East-West strategic balance would be upset. The concomitant weakening and possible collapse of the Warsaw Pact would intensify a threat to Soviet security. If Gorbachev were to see the situation in this light, or if the Soviet leadership were to impose this view and if necessary replace Gorbachev, it would magnify the uncertainties and dangers for Eastern Europe and hence for overall European and American security.

Baker visited Moscow in early February and heard

Gorbachev's concerns about German reunification. The secretary of state acknowledged legitimate Soviet security issues, and made clear that the United States would not seek to exploit the situation to the detriment of Soviet security interests. Baker also made clear why a reunified Germany should remain in NATO. He drew a useful distinction between problems that must be resolved only by the German people, and others that should be dealt with by the four World War II allied powers (Great Britain, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union). On February 13, agreement was reached on a "Two-plus-Four" framework for dealing with German reunification (that is, parallel negotiations between the four powers and the two German states).

By mid-1990 many in the United States and Europe had become uneasy about the priority the Bush administration gave to shoring up NATO, in contrast to no more than tepid interest in developing the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) or other pan-European security arrangements that would include the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries. Observers believed that by appearing to give higher priority to NATO, in which the American voice was preeminent, the United States was undercutting prospects both for early German reunification and for the development of pan-European security.

At a NATO summit in London on July 6, a declaration was issued endorsing the points that Gorbachev and Shevardnadze had been emphasizing.* The NATO meeting even invited Gorbachev to address the North Atlantic Council. It invited all the Warsaw Pact states to establish diplomatic liaisons with NATO and to join in reciprocal pledges of nonaggression and non-use of force; the summit paper also declared that "we are no longer adversaries." The declaration pledged to reduce nuclear deterrent forces, eliminate nuclear artillery, and "reduce reliance on nuclear weapons"—and "in the transformed Europe" to "adopt a new NATO strategy making nuclear forces truly weapons of last resort." It endorsed the negotiations for confidence-building measures and reductions of forces in Europe, and a CSCE summit later in the year in Paris to sign a CFE agreement.

The London Declaration was promptly praised by Shevardnadze (and later by Gorbachev) as "realistic and constructive," attaching "extremely great importance" to the nonaggression pledge, welcoming the invitation for direct contacts, and especially stressing the announcement of plans to revise NATO "military plans and concepts." Bush later disclosed that he was the principal architect of the London Declaration.

***Editor's note:** The text of this London Declaration is excerpted in *Current History*, October 1990.

****Editor's note:** The text of the Charter of Paris is excerpted in *Current History*, February 1991.

On July 16, during a visit by West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union would accept a reunified Germany that would remain in NATO. By mid-September the Two-plus-Four talks had concluded with an agreement relinquishing the occupation rights of the four wartime victors; this paved the way for the formal reunification of Germany on October 3.

The November CSCE summit in Paris was the culminating act of the reunification of Europe. The most important accomplishment was the signing of the CFE agreement to reduce the conventional arms of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.** While the original objective of reducing Soviet military forces in Central Europe and balancing the forces of the two alliances had been largely overtaken by events, the CFE agreement nonetheless was of historic significance.

SOVIET INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS AND US-SOVIET RELATIONS

Internal developments in the Soviet Union became increasingly important to United States-Soviet relations since they sometimes limited Gorbachev's freedom of action in setting Soviet foreign policy. Gorbachev and Shevardnadze had their own concerns about the changing situation in Eastern Europe and the impact of German unification, but they were compelled to take into account the even greater concerns of others in the Soviet political establishment. It was only after Gorbachev successfully tamed a conservative revolt in the Communist party at the twenty-eighth party congress in July 1990 that he was able to agree to the terms for German reunification and the CFE agreement.

The Soviet military establishment limited latitude in the START negotiations. Some compromises acceptable to Shevardnadze and Gorbachev early in 1990 had to be retracted in negotiations in April and May. There was gradual progress in negotiations throughout 1990, and the first half of 1991 finally yielded a START agreement. Even after the CFE agreement was signed, Soviet attempts to interpret its provisions in order to exclude some arms in land-based naval forces caused several months of difficult negotiation in the first half of 1991 before the issue was settled.

Internal developments in the Soviet Union not only constricted Soviet policy, but also began to affect United States policy flexibility and even policy objectives. Beginning with Lithuania's declaration of independence on March 11, 1990, and limited Soviet economic sanctions against the Baltic states (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia) in reaction to their bids for independence, vocal elements in the American public began to call for the United States to retaliate by imposing sanctions against the Soviet Union. The normalization of eco-

conomic relations and economic incentives Bush promised at Malta had to be partly withheld, although the president refrained from tying such restraint to the situation in the Baltics. On April 24, 1990, to the surprise of many, he rejected economic sanctions in response to the Soviet economic measures against Lithuania. A trade agreement and a request for most-favored-nation trade status were, however, deferred until Soviet legislation was adopted in mid-1991 that assured continued emigration (even though emigration was so great that the United States instituted some restraints on immigration from the Soviet Union!).

The growing push for independence in some of the Soviet republics caused a problem for policymakers in the United States. The United States had always championed self-determination. But political disintegration could result in violence, instability, and economic crisis in the Soviet Union. Moreover, in many cases ardent local nationalism is neither democratic nor respectful of minority rights. The Bush administration therefore did not encourage or support separatism in multinational states like the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, but urged peaceful resolution of national ethnic differences. The Baltic states were a special case for historical reasons (bolstered by the influential sentiment of a large American population of Lithuanian descent). The United States had never accepted the forced integration of the Baltics into the Soviet Union in 1940. Nonetheless, the Bush administration called for these republics to negotiate peacefully with Moscow to effect their independence.

The most severe trial for United States-Soviet relations in this period was caused by Gorbachev's turn to a more conservative stance on internal economic and political reform, together with intermittent Soviet repression in the Baltic states and broader efforts to maintain order from the fall of 1990 to the spring of 1991. Many Americans, although not the Bush administration, took signs like Shevardnadze's resignation in December 1990, brutal repression in Vilnius, Lithuania, and Riga, Latvia, early in 1991, and Gorbachev's earlier retreat from an ambitious 500-day economic reform proposal as indications that Gorbachev was abandoning reform. This was a hasty and incorrect assessment, as later events were to show, but it reflected the ups and downs of a difficult and deep transformation of Soviet society, politics, and economy. No doubt a tortuous change of course will raise such questions again in the future, and indeed, the outcome of the process is uncertain. This situation presents a continuing difficulty for American policymaking, as well as for the Soviet leadership.

FROM WASHINGTON TO MOSCOW

The summit held in Washington from May 31 to June 3, 1990, resulted in the conclusion of 16 agree-

ments covering a wide range of matters. Most important to enhancing United States-Soviet relations was Bush's decision during the summit itself to sign the trade agreement. The agreements included some modest and overdue arms control accords on bilateral nuclear testing (protocols on verification permitting ratification of the testing limitations signed in 1974 and 1976), and chemical weapons reductions of 80 percent of the arsenals of the two sides. Others were more routine: larger exchanges of university students, establishment of cultural centers, cooperation of customs services in narcotics interdiction, joint oceanographic studies, cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy, an agreement on the maritime boundary and on a Bering Straits park area, expansion of civil aviation, and a new long-term grain agreement.

The familiar subjects of regional conflicts (eased by the Nicaraguan election) and human rights (eased until the Baltic repressions) accompanied the arms control accords and the aforementioned agreements on many aspects of bilateral relations. These traditional areas of summit discussion were expanded since 1989 to include transnational world issues like ecology, terrorism, world economic problems, narcotics, and health, and increased attention to international organizations and peacekeeping.

The 1990 summit showed that United States-Soviet relations had been normalized and that new areas of cooperation were developing. By 1990 relations could be said to have returned to the high point of the 1972-1973 détente, with the prospect—but not the assurance—of remaining more permanent and more cooperative.

President Bush thus moved in the first two and a half years of his term from cautious circumspection to a new degree of engagement and mutual confidence. This could be seen in Bush's refusal to abandon the relationship when internal problems in the Soviet Union raised public doubts in the United States in late 1990 and early 1991. It was also evident in the cooperation both sides showed in the Persian Gulf crisis. Soviet cooperation with the United States in providing United Nations sanctions and a mandate for military action against Iraq could not have been obtained without the mutual rapport that had been established. While some in both countries continued to voice suspicion of the motives of the other side in the Gulf crisis, the two governments were in harmony on the basic course of action. The experience of the Gulf crisis helped to strengthen mutual confidence and prospects for future cooperation, as have cooperative American and Soviet approaches in dealing with many third world conflicts.

By the time of the Moscow summit on July 30 and 31, 1991, the changing relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union was evident. The crowning achievement was the signing of START, but even that

tended to be regarded as finishing up old business rather than representing the future agenda. The new center of gravity was the Soviet Union's economic and political situation, and outside economic support for internal reform. The United States was certainly important for this new challenge, but it was not dominant.

The bilateral summit in Moscow was only a thin follow-up to the meeting Gorbachev had had with the leaders of the world's seven major industrialized nations (Group of Seven) in London two weeks earlier. While Bush announced in Moscow that the United States would ratify the bilateral trade agreement and consider granting most-favored-nation trade status, he remarked that these merely "fulfilled our Malta goal of normalizing our [bilateral] economic relationship." The new agenda was "furthering economic reform in the USSR, and seeking to integrate the Soviet economy into the international system."

The Moscow summit furthered bilateral joint programs, including reviving cooperative space exploration. In the field of global geopolitical concerns, the familiar verbal sparring over regional conflicts on which the two powers were associated with local adversaries was now virtually a thing of the past (though not yet fully resolved over Afghanistan, and with American prodding for further Soviet disengagement from support to Cuba). The most important action at the summit concerning regional conflicts was joint sponsorship of an international conference on the Middle East to facilitate settlement of the Israeli-Arab-Palestinian conflict.

START AND FUTURE RELATIONS

The START treaty will lead to reductions in nuclear weapons of about 25 percent for the United States and 35 percent for the Soviet Union (the difference in reductions results from the rules for counting some types of weapons). These cuts only bring the totals down to roughly what they were when START negotiations began in 1982. The reductions in quick-reaction ballistic missiles, however, will be much greater within the overall totals. More important, a reduced set of ceilings on different categories of strategic weapons for the next

15 years will provide greater assurance and predictability and permit larger reductions through the domestic budgetary process. This will occur unless the United States reopens the strategic equation by deploying anything beyond the most minimal antiballistic missile system compatible with the ABM Treaty as it stands or with modest negotiated amendment.

In the future arms control will remain an important subject for negotiation, but it is unlikely to retain or regain the salience that it has held over the last two decades. The danger of war has receded, and the agenda of political consultation and economic issues has become more important in the post-cold war world.

If policy decisions during the cold war on how best to meet perceived Soviet challenges in a competitive context were sometimes divisive, new decisions on how best to serve United States interests in a cooperative context are not easy either. The most difficult issue is whether and how to provide economic assistance to aid the Soviet Union's transition to a market economy. So far the Bush administration is moving cautiously.

The relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union will continue to play an important role in international politics. For the future it will nonetheless be relatively less important because of the rising significance of Europe and Japan and of multilateral problems, agreements, and decisions on arms and arms control, as well as political and economic issues. The discussions and actions of the United States and the Soviet Union in their own relations, as well as in their broader policy agendas, already reflect awareness of this fact.

The Bush administration remains in midcourse, and the future will no doubt include unpredictable challenges, especially given the uncertainties in the ongoing revolutionary transformation of the Soviet Union (as was the case with the coup attempt in August 1991). In its first two and a half years, the administration has placed United States relations with the Soviet Union on a more solid basis than they have been in many years. The Soviet contribution to this result has been essential, perhaps even primary. Nonetheless, even if reactive, the Bush administration has risen to the challenge. ■

"The trends in Soviet foreign policy since 1985 have left a permanent mark. Even if hard-line forces can somehow regroup, displace Gorbachev, and pursue a more belligerent foreign policy, an all-out return to the cold war appears unlikely."

Soviet Foreign Policy after the Cold War

BY MARK KRAMER

On March 12, 1917, only hours after the czarist regime in Russia had collapsed, the daily newspaper *Izvestia* featured a headline that captured the spirit of the Russian Revolution: THE NEWSPAPERS WILL NOT BE APPEARING; EVENTS ARE MOVING TOO RAPIDLY.

Nearly 75 years later, it seems that events are again moving too rapidly in the Soviet Union—so rapidly that the reforms launched by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev often appear to be spinning out of control. Social discontent, ethnic turmoil, and an abortive coup have highlighted the political and economic changes brought by glasnost and perestroika. No less important, however, has been the reorientation of Soviet foreign policy. The changes in this sphere that Gorbachev implemented during his first six years in office transformed the East-West relationship and brought the cold war to an end.

Foreign policy under Gorbachev has not always been consistent, and some of the most positive changes since 1985 could still be reversed, especially if Soviet domestic politics goes disastrously awry. Nevertheless, the changes that have already taken place are so profound and so firmly entrenched that it would be extraordinarily difficult for the Soviet Union to return to a full-fledged cold war foreign policy, even under a hard-line successor to Gorbachev. Now that the international climate has been fundamentally altered, the main foreign policy challenge that Soviet leaders of any political stripe will confront in the future is internal rather than external: namely, how to prevent the Soviet Union's severe domestic problems from undermining attempts to pursue a coherent and effective policy abroad.

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POLICYMAKING STRUCTURES

Since the mid-1980s the Soviet foreign policymaking apparatus has been in almost constant flux, with sweeping replacements of personnel being accompanied by extensive organizational restructuring. Until recently, these changes were geared toward three key objectives: first, to consolidate control over foreign policy in Gorbachev's hands; second, to provide for a more flexible bureaucracy open to "new political thinking"; and third, to obtain sounder, more balanced advice on international affairs from a broader range of sources. The first goal remained constant, as Gorbachev continued to strengthen his position in national defense and foreign policymaking. But the second and third goals became less important from mid-1990 until the coup attempt in August 1991, as Gorbachev relied more heavily on the Ministry of Defense while scaling back the role he had earlier assigned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and civilian research institutes. Eduard Shevardnadze's resignation as foreign minister in December 1990, after having served as the leading architect of the "new political thinking," was emblematic of this shift in bureaucratic fortunes.

In consolidating his hold over foreign policy, Gorbachev steadily transferred power from the Communist party to state and legislative organs. Starting in mid-1988, Gorbachev sought to downgrade the office of party general secretary (which he continued to hold) as part of a broader effort to weaken the party. At first he did this by transferring functions from the general secretaryship to his new post (after October 1988) as chairman of the Supreme Soviet. But when the chairmanship of the Supreme Soviet proved insufficient, Gorbachev induced the Congress of People's Deputies to approve further constitutional changes in March 1990 that created an office known as president of the Soviet Union, to which he was appointed for a five-year term.

As president, Gorbachev acquired the title of supreme commander in chief of the armed forces, and he remained head of the Defense Council, exercising

direct control over top military officers. The Presidential Council established under the presidency included the foreign minister, the defense minister, and the chairman of the Committee on State Security (KGB); thus the key personnel responsible for foreign affairs were made directly accountable to Gorbachev.

Another round of constitutional changes in December 1990 abolished the Presidential Council and created a new Cabinet (a scaled-down version of the old Council of Ministers) and a Security Council, which were placed under the president's strict control. The foreign minister, defense minister, and KGB chairman, as members of both the Cabinet and the Security Council, remained directly subordinate to the president, as did all the top military officers who serve on the Defense Council. The precise demarcation of responsibilities among the Cabinet, Security Council, Defense Council, and presidential staff had not been resolved before the abortive coup, but the composition of these advisory bodies was radically altered after the coup was rebuffed.

Other major changes have occurred in the state and party administrative bodies that are most directly involved in foreign policy, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the International Department of the Central Committee. Until mid-1990, the Foreign Ministry, the International Department, and civilian research institutes connected with the Academy of Sciences played a much greater role in Soviet national security policy than ever before. In contrast to the pre-Gorbachev era, when only military officers offered advice on national security, Gorbachev and his top aides were intent on developing a regular mechanism for civilian input into arms control decisions and other aspects of military policy.

Gorbachev's willingness to override the military's concerns was evident as late as July 1990, when the Soviet leader agreed to accept a reunified Germany that would be a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which the military had repeatedly and vigorously opposed. Gorbachev announced this acceptance only a short time after senior military officers at the twenty-eighth party congress had expressed strong misgivings about the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. The announcement thus demonstrated the president's preeminence over the High Command.

Nevertheless, by the late summer of 1990 Gorbachev had shifted gears and had begun to give greater priority to the military's concerns in foreign policy as well as in internal matters. This decision stemmed in large part from Gorbachev's increasing frustration with fissiparous pressures in the republics of the Soviet Union. Lines of authority between the central government and the republics had become blurred, military conscription had virtually broken down, and declarations of republic sovereignty and independence were proliferating.

To contain the growing ethnic turmoil and reassert the central government's authority, Gorbachev resorted to intimidation and a violent (albeit limited) crack-down. In taking these actions he had strong support from senior military commanders, who had long excoriated "chauvinists" and "extremists" in the Baltics and Transcaucasus. Gorbachev in turn gave greater leeway to the military in arms control and other national security questions, rescinding much of the discretion he had earlier granted to the Foreign Ministry and civilian research institutes. Although Gorbachev was still willing to solicit civilian advice and ignore military input when he saw fit, the role of the professional military in arms control and national security affairs in late 1990 and 1991 had come much closer to what it was in the pre-Gorbachev era. Not until after the coup attempt, which many senior military officers had supported, did the balance of forces begin to shift back.

A FOREIGN POLICYMAKING ROLE FOR REPUBLICS

Since the late 1980s the republic foreign ministries, particularly the foreign ministry of the Russian republic, have achieved greater prominence in Soviet foreign policy. In the past the republic foreign ministries were of so little importance that few people even knew they existed. Control of Soviet foreign policy rested exclusively with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow. Although the republic foreign ministries still exert little influence on Soviet foreign policy, they have been recruiting talented officials from the central bureaucracy and developing independent contacts with foreign governments. As greater decision making is devolved to the republics under the new union treaty, the republic foreign ministries will gain an increasing say both in the central government's foreign policy decisions and in their own dealings abroad.

After initially resisting the republic foreign ministries, the all-union Foreign Ministry acknowledged that the republics deserved an increased role in foreign policy, but one that would not endanger the central government's authority. The draft of the union treaty published in late June 1991 affirmed that the republics would be regarded as "full members of the international community"; they would be entitled to establish direct diplomatic, trade, and other ties with foreign states, to conclude international treaties, and to participate in international organizations. The draft also stated that the central government and the republics would jointly "determine the foreign policy course of the USSR and monitor its implementation."

These clauses appeared to be a major breakthrough for the republic foreign ministries, but important qualifications were attached. The foreign policy activities of the republic governments were deemed permissible only if they did not "encroach on the interests" of the central government, "violate the international responsi-

bilities of the union," or "contradict the aims of the union." Furthermore, the draft made clear that the central government would retain sole responsibility for "coordinating the foreign policy activity of the republics" and "coordinating the foreign economic activity of the republics." Where and when any "joint responsibility" would come into play was left unclear. These contradictory elements in the union treaty's draft seemed bound to give rise to disputes between the central government and the republics, and that in itself was reason for the republic governments to be wary: under the draft, all such disputes ultimately would be settled by the Constitutional Court, a body controlled exclusively by the central government.

THE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS: THE FIRST TEST

The crisis that erupted in the Persian Gulf in August 1990 was the first major post-cold war test of Soviet foreign policy. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2 forced Soviet leaders to confront an unpleasant dilemma. Failure to condemn Iraq's aggression would have undermined the more benevolent image of the Soviet Union that Gorbachev and Shevardnadze had been promoting in the West, while a decision to oppose Iraq would risk the loss of the most important Soviet ally in the Middle East. Siding against Iraq would not only threaten a major strategic setback for the Soviet Union but would also incur substantial economic costs through the forfeiture of contracts for military advisers and equipment.

Faced with this dilemma, the Soviet Union did its best to pursue a dual policy during the crisis. Gorbachev and Shevardnadze backed the United States in condemning Iraq's aggression, voting for United Nations (UN) resolutions against Iraq, and complying with a strict UN embargo against Iraq. At the same time, Soviet leaders took steps to avoid causing irreparable damage to their relationship with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. They kept Soviet military advisers and most Soviet civilian technicians in Iraq for several months after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and refrained from suspending or canceling the Soviet-Iraqi treaty of friendship and cooperation.

As time wore on, it became more difficult to maintain this dual policy. By late fall 1990, as Saddam continued to ignore the UN resolutions, the Soviet Union had to align itself more decisively against Iraq and to begin discussing military options with the United States. Yet even then, Gorbachev sought to preserve some influence with Saddam's regime, in particular by sending a personal envoy, Yevgeny Primakov, to find a diplomatic

solution. Primakov called on Saddam several times, only to be rebuffed.

The continued ambivalence in the Soviet Union's approach stemmed in part from sharp divisions in the Soviet foreign policy community over the best course of action to take.¹ There is little doubt that at the highest levels Shevardnadze was the principal supporter of cooperation with the United States against Iraq, and that Gorbachev and Primakov, among others, were notably less enthusiastic. More important, many high-ranking Soviet Army officers were opposed to, or at least uneasy with, the whole policy, regarding the decision to turn against Iraq as yet another of the Foreign Ministry's ill-considered actions. After years of close cooperation with the Iraqi armed forces, Soviet military commanders were dismayed to see their efforts undermined.

Despite the pressure that the Foreign Ministry had come under from the military and the KGB, the Soviet Union took the momentous step, on November 29, 1990, of backing the UN resolution calling on Iraq to pull out of Kuwait and authorizing "all necessary means" to gain Iraqi compliance. The importance of this step cannot be overestimated, for it represented a striking shift by Moscow in its dealings with one of its most valuable third world clients. Such an action would have been inconceivable in the era before Gorbachev.

EASTERN EUROPE: LOSS OR GAIN?

Nowhere have the changes wrought by Gorbachev been more evident than in Eastern Europe. Until 1989, the Soviet Union's determination to preserve communism in Eastern Europe was not in doubt. The Soviet Army had intervened in East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in 1968 to crush challenges to orthodox Communist rule. Under the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine, Soviet leaders argued that they had both a right and a duty to intervene again if the "gains of socialism" were threatened. But within a few years of taking office, Gorbachev reversed the entire direction of Soviet policy and the Brezhnev Doctrine became obsolete. The notion of a "socialist commonwealth," which previous Soviet leaders had done their best to uphold, lost its meaning once Gorbachev not only permitted but actually facilitated the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe.

Gorbachev's radical change of course with regard to Eastern Europe brought both benefits and risks. On the positive side, the end of the Communist bloc vastly improved the climate for East-West relations (including trade relations) and eliminated the burden that Eastern Europe had long imposed on Soviet economic and military resources. It also removed a major impediment to Gorbachev's domestic reform program.

Whereas previous Soviet leaders had evoked the concepts of "socialist internationalism" and a "socialist

¹Igor Usachev, "Sovetskaya vneshnyaya politika i ee kritiki," *Kommunist*, no. 5 (March 1991), pp. 76-77; see also "Vneshnyaya politika SSSR v menyayushchiesya mire," *Krasnaya zvezda* [Red star], June 28, 1991, p. 3.

commonwealth" to confer legitimacy on the traditional Marxist-Leninist model, Gorbachev and his aides could point to the developments in Eastern Europe as evidence of the model's bankruptcy. In November 1989 a top adviser to Gorbachev, Aleksandr Yakovlev, said that the changes in Eastern Europe "pose a threat to no one, except, perhaps, to those countries that have yet to go through the process of democratization." Thus the turmoil that Gorbachev allowed and encouraged in the East bloc countries negated a key external prop on which his hard-line domestic opponents might have relied. In all these respects, the dissolution of Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe was highly beneficial for the Soviet leader.

Nevertheless, Gorbachev's new approach, for all its positive aspects, was fraught with serious risks. Events moved so far and so rapidly, and the Soviet Union's influence declined so precipitously in Eastern Europe, that the fate of the whole continent soon appeared beyond Soviet control. The demise of communism in Eastern Europe shattered the military and political integrity of the Warsaw Pact, and created pressure for the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Eastern European territory. The most important Eastern European member of the pact, East Germany, joined NATO as part of a reunified Germany in October 1990. The military organs of the Warsaw Pact were dissolved in March 1991, and the remaining components of the alliance were abolished four months later. Moreover, by mid-1991, the Soviet Union had pulled all its forces out of Hungary and Czechoslovakia and was in the process of withdrawing its troops from eastern Germany and Poland.

The fate of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), which had linked the Soviet and Eastern European economies since 1949, was no different from the pact's. The post-communist Eastern European governments denounced the CMEA as cumbersome and antiquated and sought greater economic contact with the West. In June 1991, the CMEA was formally disbanded.

The dissolution of the "socialist commonwealth" led senior Soviet military officers and orthodox Communist party officials to accuse Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, and Yakovlev of "losing" Eastern Europe and of undermining vital Soviet interests. These charges contributed to Shevardnadze's decision to resign.² Ultimately, Gorbachev was able to fend off most of the complaints, but the acrimonious exchanges on the issue underscored the magnitude of the shift in Soviet policy.

If Gorbachev had been determined to preserve Communist rule in Eastern Europe, he undoubtedly

could have succeeded (but at great cost). By launching a process of revolutionary change, he ended up negating the Soviet Union's long-standing military and political ties with the region. Undoubtedly, Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, and Yakovlev were at least partly aware of this danger when they first decided to allow Eastern Europe to go its own way, but they probably did not anticipate how rapidly the situation would fall apart or how quickly Germany would reunify. Despite the benefits Gorbachev gained from the disintegration of the bloc, the loss of Eastern Europe became a permanent rallying point for his hard-line opponents.

AFRICA AND ASIA

Although Soviet policy has evolved more gradually in Africa and Asia than in Eastern Europe, Gorbachev's new approach to the third world has produced striking results. One of the main catalysts for the Soviet reorientation was the conflict in Afghanistan. During his first two years in office, Gorbachev sought to win the war there outright by stepping up Soviet military operations. But when he recognized that victory would be unattainable without a drastic and costly escalation of the war, he reversed course and withdrew all Soviet forces. The withdrawal from Afghanistan, which was completed on schedule in February 1989, expedited a broader Soviet retrenchment in the third world, as well as a greater effort on Moscow's part to promote the diplomatic resolution of conflicts. These changes have been reinforced by the end of the cold war and the resultant increase in cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In Africa, Gorbachev has abandoned Brezhnev's policy, pursued throughout the 1970s, of offering virtually open-ended military support to Soviet clients, and sought instead to promote political resolution of long-standing conflicts in southern Africa and the Horn. The Soviet Union was instrumental, for example, in obtaining Cuban support in 1988 and 1989 for a resolution of the war involving Angola, Cuba, and South Africa. Working with the United States, the Soviet government then pushed for a full settlement of the Angolan civil war, which was finally concluded in the spring of 1991. In the Horn of Africa, Gorbachev made an even sharper break with the policies of the Brezhnev era. From the late 1980s on, Soviet officials exerted strong pressure on the Ethiopian government to resolve the bloody guerrilla war for an independent Eritrea, warning that Soviet military support would be cut off if no progress was made. Gorbachev made good on his threat, and Ethiopian leader Mengistu Haile Mariam's regime collapsed in mid-1991.

In East Asia, the Soviet Union has pressed for an end to the war in Cambodia, made steady improvements in its relations with China, and sharply curtailed its naval deployments in the South China Sea. Most important,

²See the interview with Shevardnadze in *Literaturnaya gazeta*, no. 14 (April 10, 1991), pp. 1, 3.

Gorbachev has fundamentally altered Soviet policy toward the Korean peninsula. Until recently, the Soviet Union had been staunchly allied with North Korea in its confrontation with the south. Gorbachev has not only sought to promote a rapprochement between the two Koreas but has also made dramatic overtures to the government in Seoul. He met with South Korean President Roh Tae Woo in San Francisco in June 1990—the first meeting between Soviet and South Korean heads of state. Six months later, the Soviet Union and South Korea established full diplomatic relations. Soviet trade with South Korea has grown rapidly, and Gorbachev seems to be counting on the South Koreans for substantial economic support.

Although Soviet officials have tried to maintain cordial ties with North Korea, Gorbachev has been willing to exert strong pressure on the north when it might ease tensions on the peninsula. In the spring of 1991, for example, the Soviet Union threatened to cut off nuclear fuel supplies to Pyongyang unless the North Koreans submitted their nuclear facilities to international safeguards.

Curiously, the one exception to the reorientation of Soviet policy toward Asia has been Japan. The Soviet Union has increased its high-level contacts with Japan since the mid-1980s, and Soviet officials have tried—unsuccessfully—to encourage Japanese investment in Soviet industry. Nevertheless, Gorbachev has been unwilling so far to comply with Tokyo's demand for the return of four islands in the Kurile chain that the Soviet Union occupied after World War II. Some observers expected that Gorbachev might finally offer to return control of the islands during his visit to Japan in April 1991, but no such gesture was forthcoming.

The reason for Soviet intransigence on this matter is unclear. The two northernmost islands, Shikotan and Etorofu, are of considerable strategic importance, and Soviet military commanders have urged that they remain under Soviet control.³ But that alone presumably would not be enough to deter Gorbachev from acting if he perceived a significant economic payoff. Whatever the explanation may be, Gorbachev has an incentive to change his stance, for it seems doubtful that Soviet-Japanese relations will undergo any major improvement unless the Soviet Union agrees to relinquish the islands.

³See for example the interview with General V. I. Novozhilov, commander of the Far East Military District, in *Izvestia*, June 4, 1991, p. 6.

⁴"Vstrecha v Kremle," *Pravda*, December 18, 1985, p. 1.

⁵See the interview with Viktor Yaroshenko, head of the Russian republic Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, in *Izvestia*, May 18, 1991, p. 2.

⁶"Vneshnepoliticheskaya i diplomaticheskaya deyatel'nost SSSR," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn*, no. 3 (March 1991), p. 72.

CAPITALIST AID

Unlike previous Soviet leaders, Gorbachev has been pursuing an active economic policy toward the developed capitalist world, though he did not start out to do so. During his first year and a half in office, Gorbachev repeatedly warned that increased trade with the West would leave the Soviet Union "vulnerable to pressure and blackmail on the part of imperialism."⁴ By the summer of 1986, however, a series of initiatives in Soviet foreign trade adumbrated a shift in economic relations with the West.

The foreign economic policy that has emerged since mid-1986 has three key features: a reorganization of the foreign trade apparatus along more flexible lines; the legalization of joint ventures and direct foreign investment; and a concerted effort to join international economic organizations. The intended thrust of these initiatives is to enable the Soviet Union to participate fully in world markets, thereby facilitating the tasks of modernization and reform at home. But the severe problems afflicting the Soviet domestic economy, which seem likely to continue for years, have thwarted attempts to bolster the Soviet Union's role in the world economy.

The restructuring and decentralization of foreign trade were significant from an institutional standpoint, but the effects on the volume of Soviet trade have proven relatively modest. Even though most foreign trading responsibilities have been devolved to the republic governments, significant administrative barriers continue to hamper trade, especially for products on the export control list and for civilian goods manufactured by defense-related industries.⁵

Furthermore, since most Soviet enterprises do not produce goods that are competitive abroad, they have a strong incentive to sell on the domestic market rather than pursue export opportunities. Thus a decision by the United States to grant the Soviet Union most-favored-nation trade status may have relatively little impact.

The legalization of joint ventures with capitalist firms has encountered even more serious obstacles. As the Soviet Foreign Ministry itself acknowledges,

there are still many factors that our potential joint venture partners regard as a deterrent to investment: uncertainty about social and political stability, bureaucratic complexities, difficulties in establishing contacts and business links, the disarray of finances and supplies, restrictions on the repatriation of profits, and so forth.⁶

The number of joint ventures has increased, but almost none are making a profit.

The Soviet quest to participate in major international economic organizations has produced better

results than the other foreign economic measures, but primarily for political reasons. The Soviet government applied for observer status in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in August 1986, but was turned down. By May 1990, however, the international political climate had changed so drastically that few objections were raised to granting the Soviet Union observer status. Full membership (and the privileged trade status among GATT members it would confer) will probably have to await signs of progress in Soviet domestic economic reform, but again the issue may be decided largely by political considerations, especially in the wake of the failed coup.

Soviet participation in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) once seemed inconceivable because of the organizations' requirements regarding free-market reforms, data disclosure, and currency convertibility. But at a summit meeting of the seven leading industrial countries (Group of Seven) held in July 1991, the assembled heads of state agreed to make the Soviet Union an "associate" member of the IMF and World Bank. This status, which was granted mainly to boost the political fortunes of reformist leaders in Moscow, will not allow the Soviet Union to borrow large sums of money from the IMF (as full members can), but it will enable it to draw freely on the West's technical expertise.

Despite the formidable barriers to an expanded Soviet role in the international economic order, the very fact that Gorbachev has called for "full participation by the USSR in the global economy" marks a radical departure from the past. No previous leader in Moscow would have even considered "finding a common economic language" with the main capitalist countries, as Gorbachev has often said he wants to do. The commitment to greater openness toward foreign economies is important in itself, for it suggests that Soviet leaders

will perceive their own economic reforms to be dependent on the continued prosperity of the West. To that extent, the trends in Soviet foreign economic policy may prove more durable than other aspects of Soviet relations with the outside world.

FUTURE FOREIGN POLICY

The trends in Soviet foreign policy since 1985 have left a permanent mark. Even if hard-line forces can somehow regroup, displace Gorbachev, and pursue a more belligerent foreign policy, an all-out return to the cold war appears unlikely, not least because of the changes that have already occurred in Eastern Europe.

The ultimate course of Soviet foreign policy, however, will depend on the extent to which Gorbachev or a successor can resolve the country's domestic ills. When Shevardnadze was foreign minister, he often spoke in this vein:

The achievements of our foreign policy would be much more impressive if we could ensure greater internal stability. The numerous misfortunes that have befallen our country recently—the critical situation in the economy, the state of ethnic relations, and natural calamities—are reducing the chances of success in foreign policy.⁷

If perestroika and glasnost continue to result in turmoil at home and little or no economic improvement, Soviet leaders may turn even further inward, relinquishing the last vestiges of Soviet positions abroad. But it is also possible that such trends could lead to the disintegration of the Soviet state and a highly chaotic foreign policy. In addition, there is still a remote risk that the perceived failure of domestic programs could inspire a last-ditch attempt to salvage some prestige for the Soviet Union by means of foreign expansion. The likelihood of any of these scenarios—or of scenarios that assume a full or partial economic recovery in the Soviet Union—is something that no one in the East or West can predict with confidence. ■

⁷Interview in *Novoye vremya*, no. 28 (July 11, 1989), p. 9.

The Soviet economy's continued deterioration formed a backdrop to the August coup attempt. However, despite the economy's dismal performance, the last two years have "witnessed a major breakthrough" in the Soviet Union's difficult transition to a market economy.

A Critical Time for Perestroika

BY GERTRUDE E. SCHROEDER

The last two years were a turning point for the Soviet economy.* Although economic performance was the worst in the postwar period, there was an unprecedented shift toward the production of consumer goods. Truly radical economic reform programs were promulgated and adopted. Laws concerning property ownership that would have been unthinkable five years earlier were enacted by the central government and the republics. The role of the republics in economic affairs escalated dramatically. Most important, a fatal blow was dealt to the Stalinist economic system, and Marxist-Leninist ideology seemed to disappear into the pages of history. Despite these remarkable developments, the Soviet Union in 1991 has seen growing disorganization in the economy and a crisis of governance; the resolution of the latter will decisively influence the nature and pace of perestroika (economic restructuring) for the rest of the 1990s.

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¹*Ekonomika i zhizn*, no. 5 (February 1991), pp. 9–13.

²"Beyond Perestroika: The Soviet Economy in Crisis" (Paper prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency for presentation to the Technology and National Security Subcommittee of the Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, May 1991).

³For background on this issue, see Gertrude Schroeder, "'Crisis' in the Consumer Sector: A Comment," *Soviet Economy*, vol. 6, no. 1 (January–March 1990), pp. 56–64.

BLEAK ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

In 1990, for the first time in the postwar period, the Soviet government reported a fall in gross national product (GNP), industrial production, and agricultural production. Official statistics record declines of 2 percent, 1.2 percent, and 2.3 percent respectively.¹ Preliminary estimates by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) show somewhat larger declines.² The drop in industrial production was widespread, with the largest decline occurring in the metallurgical and fuels industries. Crude oil production fell by 6 percent and coal production by 5 percent. In agriculture, grain production climbed to a near-record level, but production of potatoes, vegetables, and fruits and berries fell between 7 and 12 percent. The only other bright spots in this otherwise gloomy picture were gains in the production of consumer durables and alcoholic beverages and modest advances in the provision of services.

Thanks to the increased domestic output of consumer goods, continued high imports, and a draw-down of inventories, the government managed to increase real per capita consumption in 1990, but at a markedly slower pace than in 1989. Much of the gain was the result of sizable increases in the supply of alcoholic beverages and consumer durables produced in defense industries. But as in the preceding two years, consumers did not perceive the benefits from these small gains, because of imbalances in consumer markets.³

The population's money incomes rose by 17 percent in 1990 (compared with 13 percent in 1989), widening the gap between incomes and the supplies of goods and services and adding to inflationary pressures. According to official estimates, the consumer price index for goods and services rose by 5 percent in 1990—more than double the 1989 rate. The CIA estimates an inflation rate of 14 percent in 1990. Moreover, the rate of inflation accelerated during the year. Collective farm market prices rose by 29 percent, and black market prices continued to climb.

Accelerating price increases and rumors of more to come led people to continue large-scale hoarding, with household food stocks rising by as much as 100 percent, according to Goskomstat, the Soviet statistical agency. Empty shelves, queues, rationing, and special distribution systems bypassing the retail stores became commonplace. The government's supply-side strategy to balance the consumer market had clearly failed, as did its efforts to curtail income growth.

State investment declined by 4 percent in 1990, the first such decline since World War II. Defense expenditures also dropped by 6 percent. The decline in investment resulted entirely from deep cuts in government expenditures on investment and the mothballing of projects as the government tried to cope with the huge budget deficit. But investment financed by enterprises rose sharply as they rushed to start new projects. Good news was lacking on other fronts. The budget deficit continued to grow, and cash outflow increased by more than 50 percent. The volume of foreign trade dropped by 7 percent, the balance of payments deficit was 10 billion rubles, and foreign debt increased by 38 percent.

Despite the growing economic problems, the drive to orient production toward the consumer sector—a major goal of perestroika—picked up in 1990. Goskomstat reports an unprecedented decline of 3.2 percent in production in heavy industry, while production increased 4.4 percent in consumer-related industry. The shift from defense to civilian production also appears to have accelerated, along with the redirection of investment toward consumer goods industries and the development of social infrastructure.

The economic situation has continued to deteriorate seriously this year. GNP fell 10 percent during the first half of the year compared with the corresponding period in 1990. Industrial output dropped by 6 percent, with heavy industry registering a decline of 7 percent and consumer-related goods a decline of 3 percent.

The Soviet economy is in trouble, but it is unfortunate that many Soviet and Western observers describe the worsening economic plight in apocalyptic language. Undefined terms such as "collapse," "catastrophe," "chaos," and "abyss" replace dispassionate description and analysis. Journalists and economists

feel free to pull out of the air a wide range of numbers purporting to measure the decline in GNP and the rise in inflation, and disseminate absurdly low figures for Soviet GNP and standard of living relative to those for the United States. However, an economy's relative size and rate of growth can be determined only by careful measurement, using internationally accepted procedures. The casual empiricism that has flourished in the last two years neither aids Western understanding of real economic conditions in the Soviet Union nor helps the Soviet government, which urgently needs to know the actual economic situation in order to devise appropriate policies.

THE RADICALIZATION OF ECONOMIC REFORM

Last year witnessed a major breakthrough in the radicalization of programs for economic reform. For the first time comprehensive blueprints for dismantling the institutions of central planning and replacing them with those for a market economy were published. Two of these radical programs were approved by legislative bodies. The harbinger of this momentous development was the so-called "Abalkin Blueprint" of October 1989, which focused on property ownership as the centerpiece of reform.⁴

The most radical of the economic reform programs appeared in August as the much touted "500-day" Shatalin plan, which was ultimately adopted "in principle" by the Russian republic legislature, although it was rejected by the federal legislature.⁵ The Shatalin program was notable for its stress on property rights and for its rapid timetable for privatizing property and decontrolling prices, which are essential for a market economy. The basic features of the Shatalin program were incorporated in more general form into the so-called Presidential plan, which was adopted by the Soviet Congress of People's Deputies on October 19, 1990.⁶ In addition to provisions for systemic reform, the Abalkin, Shatalin, and Presidential programs contained assorted formulas and schedules for "stabilization"—that is, for reversing the massive financial disequilibrium afflicting the economy.

Although it lacks the explicit 500-day timetable of the Shatalin plan, the Presidential plan is nonetheless radical. While one can fault the Presidential plan for its generalizations and lack of a detailed schedule, it represents a major breakthrough in conceptualizing economic reform. The plan is especially striking when compared with the comprehensive program of economic reforms adopted in July 1987, which Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev labeled "radical" and "revolutionary" at the time.⁶ If it were implemented throughout the Soviet Union, the Presidential plan, as supplemented in early 1991 and along with a spate of new laws now on the books, would ultimately destroy the institutions of Stalinist central planning and create

⁴The plan's formal title is "Basic Guidelines for Stabilization of the National Economy and Transition to a Market Economy."

⁵Ed A. Hewett, "Perestroika-Plus: The Abalkin Reforms," *PlanEcon Report*, vol. 5, nos. 48-49 (December 1, 1989). The plan was named after Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Leonid Abalkin, whose office drafted it.

⁶Ed A. Hewett, "The Soviet Plan," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 69, no. 5 (Winter 1990-1991), pp. 146-147. The plan was developed under the guidance of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's economic adviser, Stanislav Shatalin.

⁶For an analysis of this "half-measure" see Gertrude Schroeder, "Anatomy of Gorbachev's Economic Reform," *Soviet Economy*, vol. 3, no. 3 (July-September 1987), pp. 219-241.

new ones for a market economy with a substantial state sector.

In a marked departure from past reform legislation, the Presidential plan states that there "is no alternative to switching to a market" and that the "choice of switching to the market has been made, a choice of historic importance to the fate of the country." The plan calls for "resolute measures" to privatize and diversify control of the economy, drastically shrinking the economic domain of the central government and expanding that of the republics. It envisages an 18-month to 2-year transition period for switching over to a market-oriented economy, after which the new institutions will be consolidated and the economy will improve. Whatever one may think about that timetable under present conditions, the Presidential plan itself represents a decisive break with the past. If its prescriptions can be carried out, the Soviet economy will finally, after 25 years, get off the treadmill of reform programs that failed to reshape the institutions of central planning.

The year 1990 marked a watershed in the extent and type of reform legislation the central and republic governments adopted. Merely listing the subjects of the major federal laws and decrees of 1990 shows their unprecedented nature: relaxation of laws against private property ownership and the private ownership and disposition of land; encouragement of small businesses; demonopolization and prevention of monopoly; establishment of a Western-style central bank and a commercial banking system; the creation of a uniform system of taxation on business profits; the setting up of joint-stock companies and a securities market; and general laws on investment and employment. All this legislation had taken effect by January 1, 1991.

Some progress was made during 1990 in establishing new forms of business ownership. Goskomstat reported that at the end of the year leased industrial units produced 5.2 percent of total industrial output; cooperatives employing 6.2 million people accounted for about 7 percent of GNP; 40,600 individual peasant farms were in operation; and about 1,200 joint-stock companies and 3,000 joint enterprises with foreign partners had been registered. Goskomstat also noted that some 1,400 cooperative and commercial banks were operating and that a stock exchange had been opened in Moscow.

REFORM BY DECREE

On September 24, 1990, the Supreme Soviet gave Gorbachev the authority to implement economic measures by decree until March 31, 1992. He is also authorized "to give instructions on matters of property relations, organization of the management of the economy, the budget and financial system, pay and price formation, and the strengthening of law and order."

Three presidential decrees, adopted on September

27, October 4, and December 14, respectively, attempt to arrest the growing disarray in the industrial supply system by ordering all enterprises to maintain existing contractual ties through 1991; introducing a new set of wholesale and procurement prices on which 1991 contracts were to be based; and declaring invalid all inter-enterprise and inter-regional arrangements that disrupt existing ties.

Several decrees, supplemented by a Council of Ministers decree, address acute problems in the consumer sector. They establish higher interest rates on savings deposits; free prices on designated luxury consumer goods; authorize worker groups to monitor the distribution of food supplies; outline steps to stabilize the distribution of food supplies and raise their level; remove 50- and 100-ruble notes from circulation; and impose limitations on withdrawals from savings banks.

Three presidential decrees and a Council of Ministers decree relate to foreign trade. They provide more favorable conditions for foreign investors in joint ventures (including 100 percent ownership), establish a new commercial exchange rate, and centralize a larger share of enterprises' hard currency earnings in a Union-Republic Foreign Currency Fund. Two more decrees, issued on December 29, 1990, levy a nationwide tax of 5 percent on the gross turnover of all enterprises and establish all-union and republic economic stabilization funds, which will be capitalized from the confiscation of a portion of enterprises' amortization and incentive funds and other sources. The stabilization funds are to be used to finance union-wide programs for investment and research and development, military conversion costs, and grants to the poorer republics and to enterprises experiencing financial difficulties.

Finally, on January 26, 1991, Gorbachev issued the highly controversial decree entitled "On Measures to Combat Economic Sabotage and Other Crimes in the Economic Sphere." This authorizes the police and state security agencies to inspect the premises and records of businesses for violations of state laws. The decree covers firms of all forms of ownership, including foreign-owned firms and joint ventures.

The radicalization of reform continued during the first half of 1991. The government raised industrial wholesale prices sharply on January 1, 1991, but also allowed approximately 40 percent of industrial wholesale prices to be determined by contractual negotiations between buyers and sellers, with some restrictions that likely cannot be enforced. After much hesitation, the government raised retail prices on April 2 by about 60 percent on average, and simultaneously allowed between 40 and 45 percent of all retail prices to be freed or kept below set ceilings, which also will be difficult to enforce. While this move eliminated most of the enormous subsidies on food that had distorted consumer demand and burdened the state budget, its effect was

largely offset by cash payments to the population.

New federal laws on monopolies, privatization of property, and foreign investment were drafted. In March, the Supreme Soviet passed a law on foreign currency that took steps toward making the ruble convertible through regular auctions. On April 4 the legislature adopted a law greatly liberalizing earlier legislation on business activities by individuals and small groups. Less than a week later, Gorbachev unveiled an "Anti-Crisis Program" to halt the deterioration of the economy; the program also proposed the accelerated privatization of property and the speeding up of the freeing of prices and removal of state controls over enterprises. This measure was followed a little over a month later by another "Anti-Crisis Program" that set specific dates for implementation. Unlike its predecessor, this program was endorsed by the leaders of 13 of the 15 republics.

THE RISE OF REGIONAL ASSERTIVENESS

The meteoric rise in the assertiveness of republic and lower level government bodies in the economic arena in 1990–1991 was not only unprecedented but also extremely complex. The economic dimension cannot be separated from the political dimension. Building on their earlier initiatives to gain "economic sovereignty," Georgia, Armenia, and the three Baltic republics declared their independence or their intention to move toward it. By the end of 1990, all the republics had issued declarations of "sovereignty," a concept that for them included control over their own economic affairs. These declarations differ considerably among republics and are general in nature, but most assert the primacy of republic laws over federal laws and claims of republic ownership of land and natural resources.

Early in 1990, the Supreme Soviet adopted a law entitled "On the Fundamentals of Economic Relations Between the USSR and the Union and Autonomous Republics." This law, which took effect on January 1, 1991, outlines the areas of responsibility reserved for the central government, prescribes general procedures for formulating the all-union budget, and stresses the primacy of federal laws over those of the republics. A major section deals with the "all-union market." Republics are forbidden to discriminate against one another in economic matters or to erect barriers to inter-republic commerce. They are authorized to enter into treaties with the central government and with other republics. The Council of Ministers was instructed to draft implementing documents and procedures.

But events did not wait for the law's orderly implementation. One by one the republics (and some lower

level bodies) began to sign treaties and economic cooperation agreements with one another, a movement that gathered speed in the second half of 1990 as the economy deteriorated.

These agreements vary widely but most contain a pledge to maintain existing trade ties at least at the 1990 level during 1991. In some cases it seems that the republics forged new ties during 1990 that disrupted those in union-dictated orders, a development that led to the presidential decree invalidating such arrangements. Most of the republics and many local bodies also moved to establish direct trade ties with foreign countries. Several localities declared their intention to establish free-trade zones. Finally, moves were made to conclude treaties of cooperation among groups of republics, such as the Baltics and the four major central republics (Russia, the Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Kazakhstan).

Republic legislatures have also drafted or enacted laws on economic matters, the Baltic republics being the most active in this regard. Some of these laws, such as those concerning land reform, property, enterprises, and taxes, conflict with federal legislation, and have created massive confusion in their implementation. The whole process has been described as the "War of Laws."

Connected with this war and the declarations of republic sovereignty were the conflicts that erupted between the central government and the republics over the control of individual enterprises. The Baltics in particular fought battles with Moscow over this issue, as did the Ukraine over its coal industry. Following disruptive miners strikes, Russia and the Ukraine were granted control over their coal mines.

Acrimonious debates also erupted over interrepublic economic dependencies. The argument often was couched in terms of "Who feeds whom?" and was related to discussions about how individual republics would fare economically if they were to leave the union. All this prompted Goskomstat to release an unprecedented amount of data showing the extensive trade ties that had developed among the republics over the years as a consequence of centrally dictated development policies that had fostered specialization rather than diversity in republic economies. The new data revealed that most of the republics had large balance of trade deficits, irrespective of whether domestic prices or so-called "world market prices" were used to value trade flows.⁷

The most revealing set of data related trade flows to republic production and consumption.⁸ In 1988 the share of exports (including foreign) in the total value of republic production ranged from 12 percent in Russia and Kazakhstan to 27 percent in Byelorussia; the share exceeded 20 percent in most other republics. The share of imports in total republic consumption ranged from

⁷*Vestnik statistiki*, no. 4 (April 1990), p. 49.

⁸*Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1989 godu* (Moscow: Goskomstat, 1990), p. 635.

15 percent in Russia to 31 percent in Armenia, with shares of 22 percent or more for most of the other republics. Only four republics were self-sufficient in energy in 1988 (as measured in standard fuel equivalents). Revelations such as these no doubt were intended to cool the fervor for secession from the union.

An unfortunate development that figured largely in the economic downturn in the last half of 1990 and early 1991 was growing regional autarky. As the economy deteriorated, especially in the consumer sector, more and more republics and local entities took steps to protect their own people from the endemic shortages of almost everything, especially food. Schemes were introduced to restrict purchases to local residents, and various government bodies banned the export of certain products. The Baltic republics attempted to set up customs controls on their borders. Such moves exacerbated economic difficulties and frustrated central government efforts to acquire and distribute food stocks. Some local bodies and many enterprises negotiated barter deals with neighboring territories to secure supplies. These developments culminated in the issuance in January 1991 of a presidential decree and Council of Ministers decrees embodying an "agreement" approved by the newly formed Federation Council to try to augment food supplies and stabilize markets.

Toward the end of 1990 and in early 1991 battles were also waged over budgets, in particular over the size of republics' "contributions" to the federal budget. Gorbachev finally managed to forge an accord with the republics on budgetary and related matters and coordination of price, wage, and social policies. Although the Federation Council endorsed the agreement "in principle," several republics (including Russia) failed to remit their promised payments to the union budget. The resulting budgetary crisis and quickening economic decline precipitated the series of anti-crisis programs.

A CONCLUDING PERSPECTIVE

The decade has begun with declining production, rapidly rising inflation, a macroeconomy in massive disequilibrium, and an economic system that has been only partially reformed. But a larger perspective must include the remarkable legacies of 1990 and spring 1991. At long last there is a detailed and reasonably coherent program for real systemic reform and a body of legislation that is worth trying to implement. Reflecting the speeded-up learning process under perestroika, Soviet leaders have agreed that a market economy must be created to replace the failed command

system. At issue still are the strategy and pace of transition and the costs the leadership is willing to incur to bring change about.

Amid all the seeming chaos, much is happening that augurs well for the future. Entrepreneurs are coming forward, people are taking the initiative in dealing with their problems, enterprises are beginning to act on their own, local and regional government bodies are taking charge of their affairs, foreign firms are starting to invest in the Soviet Union, and individuals at all levels are interacting with their counterparts abroad in a wide variety of endeavors.

Although six years of perestroika have wrought considerable havoc on the economy, the real crisis in the Soviet Union in 1991 is one of governance. The uncertainty over who is in charge of what is generating confusion, fostering a sense of popular despair, and discouraging foreign aid and investment. The latest anti-crisis program and related legislation represent a practical approach to stabilizing the financial situation and simultaneously creating market-oriented institutions. But carrying out that program requires a strong central government with the will and authority to see it through. Resolution of the crisis of governance is also essential for economic reform programs that might be undertaken by individual republics, for their economic fortunes are intertwined with the union's, whether they like it or not.

In holding a public referendum on preservation of the union and negotiating a new union treaty and constitution, Gorbachev seeks to create a central government with sufficient authority to enforce unpopular macroeconomic policy, manage a nationwide infrastructure, and formulate foreign and defense policy. He has made it clear that he wants to save the union and strengthen a large common internal market within which autonomous business units can operate freely in response to market signals. His reform program now also involves an unprecedented delegation of decision-making authority to the republics and to lower level bodies.

If Gorbachev succeeds in forging an enduring political consensus, economic reform can proceed at all levels, along with the integration of the Soviet economy into the international community. If Gorbachev fails, it will be an entirely new ballgame for the rest of the 1990s. It would be a great tragedy if the Soviet people and their leaders failed to build on the tumultuous developments of 1990 and spring 1991 in order to begin the long and arduous task of making a better life for themselves and their children. ■

"Gorbachev is taking a risk in seeking détente, perhaps even an entente, with organized religion, and his efforts have not been uniformly successful. But his opening of the country to religion is a quintessentially democratic act that has generated considerable enthusiasm among the people."

The Revival of Religion

BY DAVID E. POWELL

From the beginning of the Soviet regime until recently, Lenin and his successors demonstrated fear of and contempt for "the opiate of the people." Concerned about the political and economic influence of the church, and fearful of any alternative belief system challenging the primacy of the Communist party, the leaders of the Soviet Union worked to limit religion's role in society. Their unremitting pressure (except during World War II), including the threat or use of terror and pervasive anti-religious propaganda, transformed churches and believers alike into little more than "vestiges of the past."

The first few years of President Mikhail Gorbachev's reign witnessed continued assaults against Russian Orthodoxy, Islam, and other denominations in the Soviet Union. Anti-religious propagandists were encouraged to pursue their work energetically (even though it was largely ineffectual), and each year the authorities closed a few hundred more churches. In

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¹Since the 1988 meeting, religious data for the Soviet Union have been collected and released. A major study published in 1990 concluded that more than 90 million Soviet citizens of various faiths, or one-third of the population, consider themselves believers. See *Argumenty i fakty*, no. 6 (1990). Approximately 50 million of these are adherents of the Russian Orthodox Church, according to Metropolitan Filaret of Kiev and Galicia. Commenting on another poll carried out in March 1990, the youth newspaper *Komsomolskaya pravda* pointed out that "there are many more [believers] who were not counted, since, no matter how much is written and spoken about it, this subject remains very private." Cited in Oxana Antic, "Statistics on Religion Speak a Language of Their Own," *Radio Liberty, Report on the USSR* (hereafter cited as *Report*), vol. 3, no. 2 (January 11, 1991), p. 9.

1988, however—the year of the millennium of Christianity in Kievan Rus—public policy began to change, and since then there has been a dramatic improvement in church-state relations.

HISTORIC CHANGES

On April 29, 1988, Gorbachev met with Patriarch Pimen and members of the Holy Synod (the assembly of leading hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church). The Soviet leader expressed regret about the treatment of the Russian Orthodox Church during Stalin's reign and promised that there would be genuine "freedom of conscience" in the future. Since the meeting with the Patriarch, "scientific-atheist propaganda" has been sharply curtailed and its earlier excesses denounced. Copies of the Bible and the Koran have been made more readily available than ever before, and the number of Jews allowed to emigrate and Muslims allowed to make the pilgrimage to Mecca has increased sharply. Church bells once again may be rung in the Soviet Union, and religious organizations have once again been authorized to carry out charitable work.¹

Many churches, mosques, and prayer houses, as well as cathedrals, monasteries, seminaries, and other religious buildings, have been reopened, and new ones have been built or are currently under construction. By the summer of 1988 almost 100 more Russian Orthodox Church parishes existed than had been the case one year earlier, and by the end of the year several hundred additional churches had been opened. In mid-1990 it was announced that about 5,500 parishes (4,100 of them Russian Orthodox) had been established or reactivated in a period of a little more than five years, increasing the total by almost 50 percent.

Perhaps the most striking development is that many clergymen have sought election as "people's deputies" to the country's legislative bodies. One of these individuals, Metropolitan Aleksii of Leningrad and Novgorod (who later was chosen to succeed Pimen as Patriarch), said in his election platform in 1989 that he thought it

"inconceivable that a genuine renaissance of our society [could] take place without the inclusion of the Christian element." In elections held in March 1990 approximately 300 clergymen, including 190 from the Russian Orthodox Church, were chosen to serve as deputies to the soviets (councils).

A variety of motives seem to be driving Gorbachev's rapprochement with organized religion—a quest for legitimacy, a "need" for popular support in carrying out the policies of glasnost and perestroika, a desire for allies in combating the country's social problems, perhaps even the idea of unleashing the creative energies of those alienated by decades of restrictions on religious belief and conduct. Gorbachev is taking a risk in seeking détente, perhaps even an entente, with organized religion, and his efforts have not been uniformly successful. But his opening of the country to religion is a quintessentially democratic act that has generated considerable enthusiasm among the people.

ALLOWING CHURCHES A SOCIAL MISSION

Many religious groups have begun to experiment with assistance programs, and although their proportions are still exceedingly modest such programs are playing a role in humanizing Soviet society. The Russian Orthodox Church, the Catholic Church, Evangelical Christian Baptists, Seventh-Day Adventists, Pentecostals, and several other so-called sects have been especially active. They have focused on assisting hospital patients, elderly people living at home, and mentally handicapped children, and on visiting labor camp inmates.

Churches in some parts of the country have "adopted" local hospitals, day-care centers, or orphanages—occasionally at the request of local government officials. Members of the congregation carry out repairs, decorate the premises, purchase furniture and appliances, set up clubs and workshops, and take children from shelters into their homes. Metropolitan Filaret of Kiev and Galicia has even made the extraordinary suggestion that, if cooperation between the Orthodox Church and public health authorities were legalized, medical training could be provided in convents so that nuns would be better qualified to tend the sick.

All the available evidence suggests a strong commit-

ment to such action on the part of religious leaders and ordinary believers, but a good deal of ambivalence on the part of the government to this extension of church involvement and influence. Until 1990 Soviet law did not allow churches a "social mission." Church bodies were prohibited from engaging in charitable work, and most volunteer efforts were clearly illegal. But the 1990 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations radically altered this state of affairs; its Article 23 authorizes religious groups to engage in charitable and philanthropic activities on their own and through foundations.² In view of the parlous state of the country's finances, intensified efforts by churches to help people in need will be doubly important.

SACRED TEXTS AND SUNDAY SCHOOLS

In 1988 the government authorized various Western religious organizations to send one million Bibles to the Soviet Union; other organizations have since added to the total. In late 1988 the journal *V mire knig* began to serialize the New Testament in an edition of 105,700 copies. This represented the first time since the Bolshevik Revolution that a state publishing house had made religious materials available to readers.³ Current plans call for the publication of the Bible in Russian and in other languages of the country, making it, as advocated by *Pravda*, "truly accessible to believers and atheists [alike]."

Secular authorities have also granted permission to the Saudi Arabian government to ship one million copies of the Koran to Muslims in the Soviet Union, and have allowed domestic publishing houses to print Uzbek, Kazakh, and Russian translations of the book. The Russian-language literary journal *Pamir*, the organ of the Tajikistan Writers' Union, last year began printing the Muslim holy scriptures. Religious newspapers are now appearing even in Central Asia. *Islam nuri* (Ray of Islam), published in Tashkent, explains the tenets of the Muslim faith for readers, describes how to perform various rituals and ceremonies, provides information about Muslims in other countries, and tells the faithful to fight for religious purity.

The decision to make copies of the Bible and the Koran available may turn out to have been one of the most revolutionary acts of glasnost. Having been denied access to the most basic sources of religious belief and tradition, both urban sophisticates and simple peasants had a very limited understanding of their heritage.⁴ Finally given a chance to read the Old and New Testaments, many atheists and agnostics experienced a genuine spiritual awakening. Here are the words of one man from Novosibirsk, writing to *Ogonyok* in 1989:

Now that I have turned the last page of the great book, I cannot get over the feeling of gratitude

²*Pravda*, October 9, 1990.

³See Oxana Antic, "One Million Bibles for the Soviet Union," *Report*, vol. 1, no. 10 (March 10, 1989), p. 17.

⁴In the past, atheist activists urged that copies of the Bible and the Koran be made available in order to help students become "politically conscious Marxists" and more effective anti-religious propagandists. See, e.g., *Komsomolskaya pravda*, May 13, 1988. In Khrushchev's time, a "humorous Bible" mocking the original was published in an edition of 255,000 copies. See Leo Taksil, *Zabavnaya bibliya* (Moscow: Izdatelstvo politicheskoi literatury, 1964).

and joyful shock.... [But] why only now, why so late?

At the age of 30, I have read the Gospels for the first time.... the text gripped me: I was impressed by the austere power of the words, the elegance of the finely tuned aphorisms, the subtle poetic quality of the images.... [G]radually I became very angry: what a treasure they have been hiding from me! Who decided, and on what basis, that this was bad for me—and why?... I did not run off to church.... I simply understood that I never was and never will be an atheist.⁵

This is vivid testimony to the power of Gorbachev's "revolution from above." But whether exposure to the Gospels or other religious literature will bring about a renaissance of faith among the Soviet people remains to be seen.

Beginning in 1989 the Soviet government also granted churches and (in some areas) schools permission to organize religious instruction. Latvia was the first republic to offer some form of religious education; the first Orthodox Sunday school opened in Vilnius in November 1989. (Authorities in Vilnius also granted Jewish children permission to study Hebrew and Yiddish.) By year's end, scores of church Sunday schools were operating in Moscow, Leningrad, the Baltic states, and elsewhere, serving thousands of children. In addition, several state schools began to offer optional courses on the history of religion, some of them taught by priests.

JEWIS AND THE NEW REFORMS

Greater freedom of religion has been accompanied by increasingly open expressions of anti-Semitism by members of various extremist organizations. In early 1989, for example, Pamyat (Memory) and other reactionary groups staged a rally at one of Moscow's largest sports arenas. Participants enthusiastically applauded speeches condemning the Jews for having committed numerous "crimes" against the Russian people and for their alleged lack of loyalty to the Soviet Union. Many

carried posters with anti-Jewish slogans or caricatures. One banner, proclaiming, "No to Rootless Cosmopolitans" (a Stalin-era anti-Semitic term), showed St. George slaying various "serpents"—most prominently Leon Trotsky, Yakov Sverdlov, and Lazar Kaganovich, as well as several of Gorbachev's closest advisers (many of them Jewish or presented as caricatures of Jews).*

In addition, the myth of a Jewish-Masonic conspiracy has been resuscitated, the anti-Semitic *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* has again appeared in print, and Jews have been accused of an astounding array of evil acts. These range from the forced collectivization of agriculture and repressions of the Stalin era to the corruption of Russian culture and the destruction of the environment.

At the same time, the Soviet government, elements of the media, and concerned citizens, both Jewish and non-Jewish, have spoken out against the resurgence of anti-Semitism. Major newspapers denounced the "anti-Zionist" propaganda that had served as an oblique expression of contempt for the Jews. Journalists and scholars pointed out the many parallels between such writings and those of the pre-revolutionary anti-Semitic "Black Hundreds" in Russia and Nazi propagandists in Germany.

The government has also relaxed its restrictions on expressions of Jewish identity and Jewish culture. Since 1987 the ban on teaching Hebrew has been lifted (indeed, a union of Hebrew teachers was established); a yeshiva, a Jewish cultural center, and a Jewish youth center have begun operations; facilities for the ritual slaughtering of animals, as well as bakeries for producing matzoh, have been made available; and a kosher restaurant has opened in Moscow.

Synagogues have been opened or reopened: between January 1, 1985, and July 1, 1990, the number of functioning synagogues in the Soviet Union rose from 91 to 106. Finally, record numbers of Soviet Jews have been permitted to emigrate to Israel, the United States, and Western Europe. Formerly, the peak year of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union was 1979, when 51,320 Jews were allowed to leave. In 1989, 71,217 Jews emigrated, and the figure for 1990 was an astonishing 186,115.⁶

RELIGION'S TROUBLE SPOTS

Official policy toward Islam has also undergone a major change. Media attacks directed against Muslim leaders and the faith in general occur less and less frequently, and the authorities have allowed considerably greater freedom of worship. Throughout Central Asia, Azerbaijan, and other areas with large Muslim populations, local groups have been permitted to open new mosques or to repair and reopen places of worship that had been shut during the Stalin, Khrushchev,

*Editor's note: Trotsky competed with Stalin for control of the party after Lenin's death; Sverdlov was secretary of the Central Committee, chairman of the all-Russian Executive Committee of Soviets (the titular head of state), and the person who apparently gave the order to kill Czar Nicholas II and his family; and Kaganovich was deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and one of Stalin's henchmen; one of the few Jews to survive Stalin's purges.

⁵Christopher Cerf and Marina Albee, eds., *Small Fires* (New York: Summit Books, 1990), p. 82. For evidence of concern among professional atheists that religious literature is now too readily available, see *Sovetskaya kultura*, March 12, 1988.

⁶National Conference on Soviet Jewry, "Jewish Emigration from the USSR" (New York: Soviet Jewry Research Bureau, 1991), p. 1.

and Brezhnev years. Between 1985 and 1990 the number of "working" mosques in the country rose from 392 to 1,103, an increase of nearly 300 percent.

Why has the government adopted a more conciliatory stance? Looking at the Central Asian republic of Uzbekistan, James Critchlow sees "a desperate striving on the part of the Uzbek establishment to bolster the sagging regime with new sources of legitimacy." With the Communist party "discredited by the failures and revelations of recent years," he continues, "espousal of Islam is clearly a bid for the support of traditional religious and national-minded forces in society." It is also, he concludes, part of "an attempt to fill the vacuum in society caused by the decline of secular authority—a vacuum reflected in soaring crime rates, drug abuse, etc."⁷ His hypotheses make a great deal of sense; indeed, they can be applied, by extension, to Soviet policy toward religion in general.

Of course, a policy of increased tolerance for Islam is laden with risk for the Soviet regime. For example, the Islamic Revival party, established in 1990, has pledged "to revive [the religion] in areas from which it has been driven out and to spread it to regions where it is altogether unknown or where people have a distorted notion of it." Furthermore, the party professes highly conservative beliefs, including the idea that "women must, above all, be keepers of the home and rearers of children." Thus its leadership is dismayed at some of the changes introduced under Soviet rule. To quote one official, "The emancipation introduced in our country... has had the result of estranging women from the family and home."⁸

According to Muslim leaders in Central Asia, the Islamic Revival party represents a grave social and political danger; its members are determined, they say, "to overthrow the socialist system and set up a theocratic regime."⁹ In view of the new party's militancy, some analysts in the Soviet Union have expressed serious concern about "separatist tendencies" within Islam, pointing with particular alarm to calls for a Muslim state in Central Asia.

The most complex and contrary developments affecting religion in the Soviet Union are taking place in the Ukraine, where changing church-state relations are accompanied by widening divisions and growing friction among denominations. Adherents of the Ukrainian Catholic Church (also known as the Greek Catholic or Uniate Church), which was dissolved and forcibly

incorporated into the Russian Orthodox Church by Stalin in 1946, have been trying to secure legal status for it. Ukrainian members of the Orthodox faith who resented being part of the Russian Orthodox Church have successfully campaigned for independence from it. Since October 1990 they have been permitted to function as the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. They even have their own leader, Patriarch Mystyslav of Kiev and the Ukraine.

The principal area of religious controversy in the Ukraine is the Uniates' struggle for acceptance by the state—and by the Russian Orthodox Church. The latter task appears to be more difficult. According to one estimate there were approximately 5,700 Orthodox parishes in the Ukraine in the summer of 1989; of these, more than half, located primarily in western Ukraine, were Uniate. Virtually all of these were acquired in 1946 when Stalin united the Uniate Church with the Russian Orthodox. To legalize Ukrainian Catholicism and return to it properties taken 45 years ago would be to reduce substantially the wealth and power of the Russian Church—which is already under siege from the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church.

During 1989 and 1990 significant numbers of churches were turned over to—or appropriated by—the Uniates. One recent report put the figure for Ukrainian Catholic churches at 1,737, with another 74 churches under construction. According to some Russian Orthodox clergy the takeovers are illegal acts by extremist Uniates; Ukrainian Catholics, by contrast, believe that they are simply taking back what belongs to them. Although attempts have been made to resolve the conflict through negotiation, measures taken by the two sides continue to be confrontational. Indeed, the differences between the Uniate and Orthodox churches may well be insurmountable.

BARRIERS TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION

Party, Komsomol (Communist Youth League), and government agencies in some localities resist the more permissive attitude toward religious self-expression adopted under perestroika. There are frequent reports of recalcitrant officials who refuse to acknowledge the rights of the faithful: Party activists or the chairmen of local soviet executive committees in places as diverse as Kirov, Brest, Kerch, Leningrad, Donetsk, Novgorod, and Tambov oblasts illegally obstruct groups attempting to register as a religious community, to reopen or carry out repairs on a church, and so on.

Obstructionism is prevalent partly because the shift from militant atheism to a policy that is supposed to respect a plurality of views and behaviors is difficult to make for bureaucrats who have spent their career harassing believers and religious groups. But a second factor appears to be at work as well. People in positions of authority, it seems, "yearn to show believers that

⁷James Critchlow, "Islam in Public Life: Can This Be 'Soviet' Uzbekistan?" *Report*, vol. 2, no. 11 (March 16, 1990), p. 25.

⁸*Izvestia*, January 8, 1991. This official claimed a party membership of 10,000, primarily in Central Asia and the North Caucasus. Another source puts the figure at 20,000. See *Literaturnaya gazeta*, March 8, 1991.

⁹*Komsomolskaya pravda*, April 3, 1991; see also *Soyuz*, no. 2 (1991), p. 11.

whatever may be written in the law, their word is stronger," and that they still know what is best for the Soviet Union.¹⁰

Izvestia in 1989 recounted the story of a group of teachers in a small town in Riazan oblast who had organized a church choir and been subsequently reprimanded by the head of the district Communist party organization for their lack of ideological fervor. A teacher, this party official declared, "is responsible for new and progressive ideas"; to sing hymns in a church was to engage in "the propaganda of religion"—an "unacceptable" practice in the Soviet Union, in his view. "Such people," he added, "cannot be entrusted with the education of children." (The only Communist among the teachers was expelled, as were two Komsomol members.)¹¹

In the village of Chernianka in Belgorod oblast, the local priest, attempting to regain control over a dilapidated Orthodox church, was told: "How can a new church be opened practically on the main street? That is ideologically incorrect, even anti-atheistic." In yet another example of "old thinking," a group of Baptists in the Siberian city of Krasnoyarsk was given permis-

sion to construct a prayer hall—but only on the outskirts of town, on a site that had been used as a dump.

These are not isolated incidents. Official attitudes and conduct, formed over many decades, are difficult to change—and many officials, especially those with responsibilities in the sphere of ideology, find it particularly difficult to "restructure" their own thinking. As the writer Aleksandr Nezhny has noted, "The contemptuous and dismissive attitude toward anything connected with the church, which has been drummed into us over decades, still controls our consciousness."¹²

A different kind of barrier to genuine religious freedom is the conservative character of many religious functionaries, especially the leading figures in the Russian Orthodox Church (and, to a lesser degree, Islam). One Western specialist on Russian Orthodoxy has spoken of the "Stalinist-Brezhnevian ecclesiastical nomenklatura that [has] ruled the Church since 1943."¹³ Similarly, the British historian Geoffrey Hosking has written that "decades of active persecution alternating with contemptuous manipulation have left it not only numerically reduced but spiritually debilitated.... Enfeebled by subservience to an atheist state, the Church is no longer fit to act as [a] vehicle for [a] religious revival or to promote social solidarity."¹⁴

In early 1990 the Holy Synod stated publicly that the government had been interfering in church appointments and in the administration of parishes for many years. Indeed, some have raised the question of whether the new Patriarch might not have cooperated too closely with the state in the past. Even if the public continues to regard Orthodoxy itself and Jesus Christ himself with reverence, the Church will not be able to exercise a full measure of influence until a new generation assumes leadership positions within it.¹⁵ ■

¹⁰"Believers' Right to Register," *Soviet Analyst*, vol. 17, no. 9 (May 4, 1988), p. 5.

¹¹*Izvestia*, September 28 and 29, 1989.

¹²"Church Gains from the Millennium?" *Soviet Analyst*, vol. 17, no. 12 (June 15, 1988), pp. 6–7.

¹³Vladimir Moss, "Russian Orthodoxy and the Future of the Soviet Union," *Report*, vol. 3, no. 24 (June 14, 1991), pp. 3, 5.

¹⁴Geoffrey Hosking, *The Awakening of the Soviet Union* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 113, 115.

¹⁵For survey data underscoring the popularity of the Church, as well as the pervasive and intense feeling of admiration for Christ, see *Moskovskiy novosti*, nos. 21, 22, and 49 (1990).

The Soviet Union faces an environmental crisis that has only recently been openly acknowledged and acted on by the government. Enormous clean-up costs, inexperience with pollution control technology, and a government focused on reforming itself and the economy mean that the country "faces a long road to environmental recovery."

Environmental Problems and Policies in the Soviet Union

BY HILARY F. FRENCH

In July 1988 at the nineteenth congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union, Fyodor Morgun, head of the newly formed State Committee for the Protection of Nature, declared: "One might say that for a whole era our party and professional propaganda and science have been intolerably passive as far as ecology is concerned.... For many decades, the environment has been undergoing catastrophic pollution. Behind the facts of outrages upon nature and damage done to human health are certain people in science, design institutions, and... state commissions, with whose blessings facilities were put into operation [that] destroy nature.... [Those responsible] should be mentioned by name and punished...."

Morgun's speech marked the first official response to the Soviet Union's environmental awakening. In the past, Communist propaganda posters had celebrated the emphasis on rapid industrialization, and billowing smokestacks had been regarded as a symbol of national prowess. But the shock of the Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident in April 1986 and the new freedoms offered by glasnost combined to create a powerful grassroots environmental movement. Local activists across the country have increasingly demanded that the government take action to combat the severe air pollution, water contamination, and toxic waste problems that plague the Soviet Union.

The environmental crisis is contributing directly to the country's dire economic situation. The bill from the

Chernobyl accident alone is expected to exceed \$350 billion, 14 percent of the Soviet Union's gross national product (GNP) for 1988. Hundreds of factories producing scarce goods such as medicine and paper have been closed in recent years because of environmental protests. Pollution and natural resource degradation are estimated to cost the country as much as 17 percent of GNP annually.

The Soviet Union thus faces a paradox: environmental reconstruction is critical to economic recovery, but economic recovery is needed to furnish investment capital for environmental improvements. However, the current period of revolutionary change in the Soviet Union provides opportunities to address environmental and economic problems together. To succeed, environmental reform must be viewed as a key component of economic and political reform rather than as a sideshow.

AN INDUSTRIAL WASTELAND

The Soviet Union's rapid post-World War II industrialization drive created heavy polluters such as steel producers and chemical manufacturers. Since then, industry has failed to modernize and install effective pollution controls. The result is pollution reminiscent of the early stages of industrialization in the West.

According to the Soviet national environmental report, air pollution levels in 103 cities, home to more than 50 million people, exceed the Soviet standard (which is generally stricter than United States standards) by a factor of 10. In 1988, 16 towns periodically experienced pollution levels more than 50 times higher than the standard.¹

Industrial by-products not pumped into the air tend to be dumped into bodies of water at levels almost unimaginable in the West. Industrial discharges, combined with untreated sewage and agricultural runoff, have contaminated most of the rivers, lakes, and seashores in the Soviet Union.

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¹USSR State Committee for the Protection of Nature, *Report on the State of the Environment in the USSR* (Moscow, 1989), pp. 11-15.

In 1988 only 30 percent of the Soviet Union's sewage was adequately treated. Fifty percent was improperly treated, and the remaining 20 percent was dumped into the environment untreated. Many large cities, such as Kaunas, Lithuania, and Riga, Latvia, still do not have any sewage treatment facilities. Not surprisingly, clean drinking water is in scarce supply: in 1988, 18 percent of water samples nationwide failed to meet health standards.²

Industrial pollution and agricultural runoff are threatening Lake Baikal, the world's largest body of fresh water. The lake contains 80 percent of the Soviet Union's supply of fresh water and supports 2,400 species of plants and animals, more than two-thirds of which are found nowhere else on earth. A comprehensive plan to clean up the offending enterprises was implemented in 1987, but progress has been slow. By January 1989, only 26 of 41 environmental projects (such as improving sewage treatment and enforcing discharge limits from paper mills) had been completed as planned. Nearly two-thirds of the projects scheduled to commence in 1988 were not begun.³

The country's polluted rivers ultimately find their way to the seas. The Caspian Sea receives 40 percent of the Soviet Union's annual 28.6 cubic kilometers of polluted wastewater, most of it from the Volga River. The Black and Baltic seas are also severely polluted. The catastrophic condition of these seas has economic repercussions. At one time the Caspian was home to 90 percent of the Soviet Union's caviar-producing sturgeon fishery. But populations of sturgeon and other valuable fish have declined by more than two-thirds over the last 20 years. Beaches along the Caspian, Black, and Baltic seas have closed periodically during the last few years because of pollution, and resorts such as Yalta on the Black Sea and Yurmala on the Baltic are imperiled.

Although data are scarce, hazardous wastes appear to have been indiscriminately dumped on land throughout the Soviet Union. More than half the country's nearly 6,000 official landfills do not meet sanitary regulations. In Uzbekistan, Georgia, Moldavia, Latvia, and Turkmenistan, more than three-quarters of the landfills are not in compliance with regulations.⁴

Illegal dumping, however, is the greatest concern. Soviet analyst D. J. Peterson of the RAND/UCLA Center for Soviet Studies in Santa Monica, California, notes,

Every week, the Soviet press carries a new story about the discovery of improperly disposed of, often hazardous, wastes. The picture pieced together from these reports is, in essence, one of enterprises dumping their wastes wherever and however it is convenient for them, with little monitoring by officials and no threat of prosecution for violation of environmental codes.

The military is apparently responsible for some of the most flagrant cases of improperly handled waste, especially radioactive waste from nuclear weapons complexes. In the early 1950s bomb producers in Chelyabinsk pumped waste into Karachay Lake, a 41-hectare body of water that has no outlet, until the accumulation reached 120 million curies, about two and a half times greater than the amount of radiation released by the Chernobyl nuclear accident.

THE HEALTH TOLL

The Soviet Ministry of Public Health has studied the health of those living in areas where industrial pollution is unusually high. According to the national environmental report, a clear link has been established between air pollution levels and the incidence of a variety of ailments. The higher the overall level of pollution, the higher the rates of malignant tumors and respiratory and skin diseases.

The ministry also found a correlation between the types of illnesses observed and the kinds of industry in the region. Fertilizer production appeared to be related to an increase in cancer rates and in those for blood and cardiovascular diseases. Nonferrous metal works were associated with increased rates for skin diseases and cancer among children. Young children in regions where pesticide use is high have overall rates of illness five times higher than those of children living in relatively clean areas.

In the Karakalpak Autonomous Republic, which encompasses the southern part of the Aral Sea, infant mortality is 60 deaths per 1,000 live births—the highest in the country and comparable to rates in Cameroon and Guatemala. This is thought to be due to both the poor health care system in the region and to the contamination of water and food with pesticides and salts.

In Aktyubinsk in northern Kazakhstan, where many chemical plants are located, the Ministry of Public Health found that various cancers occur six times more frequently than in adjacent regions. People living in the center of Alma-Ata, the capital of Kazakhstan, suffer from respiratory diseases 2.4 times more frequently than suburbanites, and from nervous-system diseases 4.5 times as frequently. Bronchial asthma among children living inside Sadovoye Koltzo, the highway encir-

²D. J. Peterson, "The State of the Environment: The Water," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Report on the USSR* (hereafter cited as *Report*), March 16, 1990.

³D. J. Peterson, "Baikal: A Status Report," *Report*, January 12, 1990; John Massey Stewart, "The Great Lake Is in Great Peril," *New Scientist*, June 30, 1990.

⁴D. J. Peterson, "The State of the Environment: Solid Wastes," *Report*, May 11, 1990.

cling Moscow, is twice as common as among children living outside the road.

DAMAGED LAND, DECLINING PRODUCTIVITY

Mismanagement of natural resources rivals industrial pollution as a contributor to the country's environmental decline. Land degradation, for example, is a major barrier to raising agricultural productivity. At least 1.5 billion tons of topsoil in the Soviet Union are eroded each year. Production losses attributable to soil erosion cost the Soviet economy between \$31 billion and \$35 billion annually.⁵

Industrial pollution is also lowering crop yields. By unhappy coincidence, the major sources of pollution in the Soviet Union are located in agricultural areas. The worst culprits are the metallurgical centers. According to the national environmental report, in 1988 lead concentrations in soil from around the village of Glubokoye, a nonferrous metallurgical center, were found to be 22 times the permitted level, while cobalt and zinc concentrations exceeded standards by factors of 10 and 100 respectively. Mercury concentrations of up to 100 times the allowed level have been observed in Khaidarkan, Kirghizia.

Inappropriate use of fertilizers and pesticides is another environmental hazard. Prices for these agricultural inputs are heavily subsidized, leading farmers to dump more and more of them on the land regardless of whether they are raising yields commensurately. Application rates are often determined by a planner in a distant city who is unlikely to know the rate appropriate to a particular locality, or who is unaware that a pest has developed resistance to a certain chemical.

An audit conducted by the State Planning Office (Gosplan) found that 11 percent of fertilizer production never reaches the field because of transport and storage problems. *Pravda* suggested, perhaps only half in jest, that Soviet farmers sow their crops along the railroad tracks, since so much fertilizer is lost on the way from factory to farm. One-third of the fertilizer applied runs off into the groundwater.

Similar problems plague pesticide use. According to Alexei Yablokov, deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet's environmental committee and a leading environmentalist, almost one-third of the pesticides produced for domestic consumption in the Soviet Union never reach their destination. In 1987, 30 percent of

foods contained concentrations of pesticides dangerous to human health. In some areas half the food supply was contaminated.⁶

Faulty irrigation practices are also an environmental problem. The Aral Sea disaster is the most conspicuous example of this. Until 1973, the Aral was the world's fourth-largest inland body of water. But water from the two rivers that feed it, the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya, has been diverted to irrigate cotton and other crops. As a result, since 1960 the Aral's volume has dropped 66 percent, its surface area has decreased 40 percent, and its level has fallen nearly 13 meters. The former port of Muynak now lies 48 kilometers from the shoreline. Rotting fishing boat hulls lend an eerie ghost-town feel to the once-thriving port. The former seabed has become a saline desert from which vast dust storms sweep up salt and sand and then deposit the crop-killing mixture on surrounding farmland at a rate of almost half a ton per hectare each year.

Poor forest management practices and damage resulting from air pollution and acid rain have created unhealthy forests across much of the Soviet Union. While total tree cover is increasing in the Soviet Union, coniferous forests in the European part of the country, which are easily accessible and therefore less costly to harvest, have been depleted. Farther afield, the cedar forests in the Primorski and Khabarovsk regions of the Soviet Far East have been reduced by 851,000 hectares, or 22 percent, over the last 20 years because of intensive harvesting. Clear-cutting is used to fell 90 percent of the timber supply.

According to the national environmental report, forest damage from industrial air emissions is becoming increasingly severe. Extensive regions near several industrial cities have been affected over the last 20 years. The report implicates sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, hydrogen fluoride, and ammonia emissions in the damage. The problem had not been acknowledged previously, and detailed data have yet to be released.

THE GREEN MOVEMENT

The magnitude of the environmental problems in the Soviet Union has produced a broad-based green movement. Environmental activism has risen from the underground in only a short period, and has become an integral part of the new political landscape. This young movement's successes are remarkable given the obstacles in its way; until recently, independent, nongovernmental organizing was strictly illegal, and information on the environment was a tightly guarded state secret. Nonetheless, many challenges lie ahead as the movement adapts to rapidly changing political circumstances.

Although Soviet environmentalists have only recently been allowed to play an open and active political role, the roots of their movement run deep. As many

⁵D. J. Peterson (citing Goskompriroda), "The State of the Environment: The Land," *Report*, June 1, 1990; economic costs from Herman Cesar, "Environmental Issues in the Soviet Union: Description and Annotated Bibliography" (Unpublished paper, World Bank, Washington, D.C., September 1990).

⁶Alexei V. Yablokov, "State of Nature in the USSR" (Paper presented to the "Ecology '89" conference, Göteborg, Sweden, August 1989).

Soviet ecologists like to point out, the Soviet Union made some contributions to environmental thought in the pre-Communist era through the writings of environmental philosophers such as Vladimir Vernadsky. In the late nineteenth century, Vernadsky developed a concept of a world divided into the biosphere and the "noosphere"—that part of the natural world under human influence. At an early date he warned that, if care were not taken, mankind's activities would threaten the natural world. Soviet environmentalists still see Vernadsky's concept of the noosphere as providing an essential theoretical underpinning to their movement.

Although conservationists were respected during the early years of Communist rule, they came under attack in the 1930s by Stalinists who felt that the natural world existed to be exploited. The leaders of the movement were silenced; some were sent to Siberian work-camps, and a few were executed.

In the 1960s a student movement developed at Moscow State University that fought for the protection of nature reserves and biodiversity. The movement was tolerated so long as it stuck to nature protection; confronting industrial pollution was considered subversive. During the same period a group of writers, scientists, and other intellectuals launched a crusade to save Lake Baikal. A similar group coalesced in the early 1980s in opposition to a grandiose plan that would have reversed the direction of Siberian rivers to supply water to arid Soviet Central Asia. The group achieved a major victory in 1986 when the new general secretary, Mikhail Gorbachev, mothballed the scheme.

These early environmentalist efforts revolved around a small group of elites who were able to exert influence on those in power through back channels. In the words of Russian environmentalist Natalya Yourina: "In the 1960s, only individuals protested. A [nationwide] movement didn't exist." This changed when the Chernobyl disaster of April 1986 and glasnost gave rise to an environmentalist movement encompassing diverse segments of society. Across the country people began to protest in a fashion never before witnessed in the Soviet Union. Haltingly at first, then with greater confidence as they stretched the limits of official tolerance, thousands and sometimes tens of thousands turned out for demonstrations against nuclear power plants, air and water pollution, and beach closings.

Although no reliable count exists, hundreds and possibly thousands of environmental groups have recently formed. In a recent report of the American

Committee on US-Soviet Relations, Eric Green notes: "Green activism is in the vanguard of democratization throughout the USSR."⁷

Given the tremendous variation in nationality and conditions of life in the Soviet Union, environmentalism takes on different hues in different regions. In the republics, most of which are struggling for some measure of sovereignty if not complete independence from Moscow, environmentalism takes on political overtones. In the Baltic republics, environmental protests quickly turned into independence movements, a phenomenon later repeated elsewhere in the country.

THE NUCLEAR QUESTION

Perhaps no environmental issue has been as contentious in the Soviet Union as nuclear power. Recent disclosures of the scope of the Chernobyl nuclear reactor disaster have shocked the Soviet public. Amid charges of a coverup, the government has finally conceded that the population's exposure to radiation far exceeded initial estimates. Contrary to earlier reports—and allocations of relief money—Byelorussia received the bulk of the fallout. As a result of the newly released information, 200,000 evacuations are expected by 1992 from contaminated areas in the Ukraine, Byelorussia, and the Russian republic. Byelorussian officials believe that more than 2 million people should be moved from lands poisoned by radiation.⁸

Officials in the affected republics are convinced that recent increases in cases of thyroid cancer and childhood leukemia are attributable to the accident, even though the central government and a recent report by the International Atomic Energy Agency refute this claim. A Supreme Soviet commission investigating the accident recently uncovered secret government decrees from 1987 that classified all information on the extent of radiation contamination and forbade doctors from connecting any illness to radiation exposure. Reports of grossly deformed farm animals being born in the contaminated zone confirm many people's fears that their health is endangered.

The Chernobyl accident seriously undermined public confidence in the government's nuclear power program and has put proposed plants in doubt. Plans for 30 nuclear power plants have been abandoned or indefinitely suspended since the accident.

CLEANING UP

Although the environment shows little evidence of it, the Soviet Union has stringent environmental regulations on the books. Soviet air and water quality standards are stricter than those of Western nations because they are based on a scientific determination of the level necessary to avoid health problems. And, unlike in the West, the standards do not have to survive the vicissitudes of the political process.

⁷Eric Green, *Ecology and Perestroika: Environmental Protection in the Soviet Union* (Washington, D.C.: American Committee on US-Soviet Relations, 1990), p. 34.

⁸Marnie Stetson, "Chernobyl's Deadly Legacy Revealed," *World Watch*, November-December 1990.

Unfortunately, these laws have been poorly enforced. Because most industry is still state owned, regulator and regulated are the same entity, posing a conflict of interest. Moreover, the ministries charged with industry, agriculture, and forestry have considerably more clout than the new agencies charged with environmental enforcement.

The production ministries have often been exempted from fines for environmental violations. When penalties are levied, the offending industry simply passes on the bill to the central government. The production target, which a plant manager is rewarded for meeting and penalized for failing to meet, is unaffected. Enterprises have an incentive to violate norms, since their budgets are based on past expenses, including natural resources used and fines paid; the higher the total, the greater the future allocations.

In a signal of increased official concern over the environment, a new Soviet environment agency, Minpriroda (originally called Goskompriroda), was created in early 1988. The agency, which has ministerial status, was charged with coordinating work previously spread among many ministries, and was in theory given broad enforcement powers over other agencies. Environmentalists' hopes were raised by the appointment in 1989 of Nikolai Vorontsov, a highly regarded biologist, and the first non-Communist party member ever to hold a ministry-level post in the Soviet Union, as agency chief. But he has a formidable task ahead of him. The agency has a staff of 450—there are 5,000 employees at the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in Washington, D.C.—only two computers, and a budget of 20 million rubles (\$35 million), compared with the EPA budget of \$5.5 billion.

The Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies are also important environmental actors at both the national and republic levels. During the first meeting of the Congress in 1989, delegate after delegate took the floor to decry the appalling environmental conditions in his or her district. Eighty percent of the speeches reportedly contained references to the state of the Soviet Union's environment.

Together, Minpriroda and the Supreme Soviet have been working to overhaul the country's environmental legislation. In the fall of 1989 the agency sent to the Supreme Soviet a proposal that became the basis for a resolution urging that urban air, drinking water, and food meet health standards by 1995. The resolution also called for environmental-impact assessments and economic incentives for pollution reduction. In addition, it advocated a halt to nuclear weapons testing at Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan, a reexamination of construction plans for proposed nuclear power plants, and investments in alternative energy. Translating such a comprehensive program into law, however, is proving difficult, especially given the dispute between the central

government and the republics over who should have the final authority over environmental legislation.

Gorbachev's proposed economic reforms also have critical implications for the environment. Reforms requiring industries to show a profit and be self-financing would help make fines for environmental violations pinch. In addition, reducing enormous direct and indirect energy and water subsidies for all industries, utilities, and homes would encourage conservation.

The moves for more autonomy if not independence by the republics will also have important environmental consequences. The environment will benefit if local and regional authorities have more power to close down enterprises and enforce standards. Whatever the ultimate political framework within which Moscow and the republics act, some measure of cooperation on the environment is likely.

THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

The fate of the Soviet environment is important not only to residents of the Soviet Union but to the whole world: the Soviet Union covers one-sixth of the earth's land mass and is responsible for 19 percent of emissions of carbon dioxide, the gas chiefly responsible for global warming; 13 percent of emissions of chlorofluorocarbons, which deplete the ozone layer; and roughly 20 percent of the emissions of sulfur dioxide, a principal ingredient of acid rain.

Mutual self-interest in the success of Soviet environmental reforms has spurred a wide variety of international cooperative efforts. At the nongovernmental level, Soviet environmentalists are cultivating ties with Western environmental groups and Green parties.

Intergovernmental cooperation is increasing as well. The Soviet national environmental report lists bilateral agreements on scientific and technical cooperation with 10 countries. The European Community is working with the Soviet government on a nuclear safety project, and the Norwegian, Finnish, and Swedish governments are expected to help finance the installation of pollution controls at two Soviet nickel smelters that are exporting acid emissions to Scandinavia. The United States has recently agreed to help fund a center to promote energy efficiency to be established in Moscow.

Technology transfer will also be a key to restoring the Soviet environment. Environmental aid will help purchase some of the needed technology, but indigenous environmental protection industries need to be established. This is most likely to be accomplished through joint ventures with Western firms.

The Soviet Union faces a long road to environmental recovery. However, the economic and political changes now under way provide many of the tools needed to reverse the decline. With continued pressure from the country's burgeoning environmental movement, the Soviet Union's future will be far greener than its past. ■

The days following the August coup attempt saw the Russian republic become the Soviet Union's dominant political power and many of the other republics rush to announce declarations of independence. The bids for independence were the culmination of nationalist aspirations that had been unleashed by Gorbachev's reform program. The task now is to "devise a new constitution to regulate the country's competing political interests. . . . This would be a formidable task for even the most experienced constitutional lawmakers. It may be an impossible one for the Soviet Union's new democrats."

The Slide into Disunion

BY MARTHA BRILL OLCOTT

When Mikhail Gorbachev became Soviet Communist party general secretary in 1985, he seemed confident that he had the vision and the talent to imbue the Soviet political system with the legitimacy needed to goad the population into accepting possibly disruptive but nonetheless necessary economic reforms. His assessment was partly correct—the Soviet Union's political survival depended on the regime's ability to reform the economy. But the Soviet leader woefully underestimated the complexity of his task. Political and economic reform were not only intertwined with, but also complicated by, the Soviet Union's "nationality problem."

In his early calculations Gorbachev simply overlooked this problem. Even after he realized that nationalism was an important political force, he continued to underestimate its disruptive potential. Until the failed coup in August, Gorbachev believed that economic recovery—based on preserving the Soviet Union as an integrated economic unit—would cause the nationalist movements to lose their political legitimacy.

Thus the basic tension between economic and political reforms escaped Gorbachev's attention; his decision to open the political process brought to power nationalists who opposed a united country. Given this flaw in his thinking, Gorbachev consistently stumbled over

nationality relations by offering the republics too little, too late.

THE ERUPTION OF THE NATIONALITY ISSUE

During his first years in office, Gorbachev was influenced by his late mentor, General Secretary Yuri Andropov.¹ Like Andropov, Gorbachev believed that economic reform could not succeed without the removal of corrupt Communist party cadre who were preventing the Soviet economy's modernization. On coming to office in 1985, Gorbachev launched an anti-corruption campaign against the powerful political bosses who ran the Soviet republics. One by one the longtime republic overlords were disgraced and forced to retire. Some were ousted with relative ease, but a few demonstrated their political skill by successfully parrying Moscow's best efforts to bring about their dismissals.

Dinmukhammad Kunayev, a member of the Politburo for 15 years and head of Kazakhstan's Communist party for more than 25 years, proved among the most tenacious republic leaders. However, on December 16, 1986, at a session of Kazakhstan's Central Committee that had been convened at Moscow's order, Kunayev announced that he was retiring and that his replacement would be Gennadi Kolbin, a Russian from outside Kazakhstan. As news of Kunayev's retirement spread, protesters demanding an explanation for Moscow's actions began to fill the main square in the republic's capital of Alma-Ata.

The demonstrators stayed in the square overnight. The next day special troops, armed with attack dogs and sharpened spades, were sent to disperse the crowd. After two days of skirmishes, the protests came to an end. Gorbachev and Kazakhstan's prime minister, Nursultan Nazarbayev, condemned the disturbances as "nationalist"-inspired violence. According to official

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¹For details on Andropov's policies see Martha Brill Olcott, "Yuri Andropov and the 'National Question,'" *Soviet Studies*, vol. 40, no. 1 (January 1985), pp. 105–117.

reports, one demonstrator and one policeman died, but unofficial sources say these figures are far too low.

The Alma-Ata riots strikingly demonstrated the cost of ignoring the "national" factor. The Moscow-based Russian reformers regarded Kunayev as an aging despot who had benefited those in his immediate circle at the expense of the masses. However, as protests of his removal showed, he was a hero to many Kazakhs.

Gorbachev learned his lesson. In the aftermath of the Alma-Ata riots, republic party leaders won greater discretionary authority to control their territories. The long dead Josef Stalin now became Moscow's principal target. Gorbachev planned to dismantle the Stalinist system, although no one knew quite what this meant. Glasnost, or openness, was encouraged. The people were told to speak their minds and even to join new, unofficial political groups to push for sweeping reforms.

Stalin's victims included millions of non-Russians, among them the Balts, the Crimean Tatars, and other north Caucasian peoples whose populations were forcibly deported during World War II.² In spring and summer 1987, first the Crimean Tatars and then the Balts organized protests locally and in Moscow. The Crimean Tatars demanded the return of their homeland; the Balts, official recognition that their lands had been illegally annexed to the Soviet Union. Moscow's relatively benign treatment of the protesters led other nationalities to demand real rather than symbolic political reforms.

The situation became particularly serious in the Caucasus, where tensions between the Armenian and Azerbaijani populations spiraled out of control in early 1988. In February the Politburo voted to allow the republic of Azerbaijan to retain control of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, an Armenian enclave within Azerbaijan.³ The Armenians believed they had been cheated by the Politburo decision, and more than 1 million Armenians in Yerevan protested Moscow's decision; a general strike was also organized in Nagorno-Karabakh. Tensions ran high, and in a town near the capital of the oblast, Stepanakert, two young Azerbaijanis were killed by local Armenians. In retaliation, more than 30 unarmed Armenians were killed

during an Azerbaijani rampage in Sumgait, an industrial center near Baku. The central government sent troops to Nagorno-Karabakh in early 1988 to quell the disturbances. The situation has remained more or less out of control; the troops are still in the oblast, and armed Armenians and Azerbaijanis continue to fight.

The violence in the Caucasus helped bring home the message that further political reforms were necessary to transform the stagnating Soviet political system. Gorbachev still thought in terms of revitalizing old institutions. But his efforts to reinvigorate the Communist party—marked by the July 1988 nineteenth party conference, the first extraordinary session of the party since the 1930s—proved to be little more than sloganeering.⁴

POLITICAL REFORM

By this point Gorbachev had recognized that for perestroika to succeed, the rules of the political game had to change. He called for the popular election of a Congress of People's Deputies, which would convene in May 1989. The Communist party, however, organized the elections to predetermine the winners and losers.

The party's electoral plans backfired in the three Baltic republics, where party candidates won only a handful of seats, and these mostly in Russian enclaves. In dozens of other elections throughout the country, officially orchestrated campaigns went awry—including those in which Russian republic politician Boris Yeltsin and the dissident Andrei Sakharov competed. But less than 10 percent of the seats in the Congress were won by the regime's critics.

About the time of the elections, Moscow encountered unexpected problems in Georgia when a pro-independence movement staged demonstrations in the capital of Tbilisi. On April 9, 1989, Soviet special forces using sharpened spades and, allegedly, poisoned tear gas broke up a crowd of nationalist demonstrators, resulting in the death of 20 civilians.

The chain of command in the decision to deploy the troops has never been firmly established. Gumbur Pastiashvili, Georgia's Communist party leader, was found responsible but he claimed that he had acted with Moscow's approval. Evading responsibility for this and other attacks became a hallmark of the central government. Gorbachev was out of the country at the time, but Yegor Ligachev, the ranking Politburo member, later claimed that there was full Politburo approval for the decision.⁵

The use of troops in Georgia was intended to warn nationalists throughout the Soviet Union that the Communist party would not tolerate actions that threatened its rule. For reformers nationwide, April 9 became a symbol of the repressive underside of glasnost and perestroika. For Georgians the events of that

²Alexander Nekrich, *The Punished Peoples* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), provides a detailed history of the deportation of nationalities during World War II.

³For the history of this conflict see Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union* (New York: Atheneum, 1974), pp. 193–208.

⁴XIX Vsesoyuznaya konferentsiya Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovyetskogo Soyuza: *Stenograficheskaya otchet*, Volume 1 (Moscow: Izdatelstvo politicheskoi literatury, 1988), pp. 19–93.

⁵Yegor Ligachev made this accusation in the question and answer period during his unsuccessful attempt to become deputy secretary general of the Communist party at the twenty-eighth party congress in July 1990.

ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE SOVIET REPUBLICS (1990)

REPUBLIC	NATIONALITY	PERCENT	REPUBLIC	NATIONALITY	PERCENT	REPUBLIC	NATIONALITY	PERCENT
Armenia	Armenian	89.7	Kazakhstan	Russian	40.8	Russia*	Russian	82.6
	Azerbaijani	5.5		Kazakh	36.0		Tatar	3.6
	Russian	2.3		Ukrainian	6.1		Ukrainian	2.7
	Kurd	1.7		Tatar	2.1		Chuvash	1.2
Azerbaijan	Azerbaijani	78.1	Kirghizia	Kirghiz	40.7	Tajikistan	Tajik	58.8
	Russian	7.9		Russian	22.0		Uzbek	22.9
	Armenian	7.9		Uzbek	10.3		Russian	10.4
Byelorussia	Byelorussian	79.4		Ukrainian	2.6		Tatar	2.1
	Russian	11.9	Latvia	Tatar	1.7	Turkmenistan	Turkmen	68.4
	Polish	4.2		Latvian	53.7		Russian	12.6
	Ukrainian	2.4		Russian	32.8		Uzbek	8.5
Estonia	Jewish	1.4		Byelorussian	4.5		Kazakh	2.9
	Estonian	64.7	Lithuania	Ukrainian	2.7	Ukraine	Ukrainian	73.6
	Russian	27.9		Polish	2.5		Russian	21.1
	Ukrainian	2.5		Lithuanian	80.1		Jewish	1.3
Georgia	Byelorussian	1.6		Russian	8.6		Byelorussian	0.8
	Finnish	1.2	Moldavia	Polish	7.7		Moldavian	0.6
	Georgian	68.8		Byelorussian	1.5		Polish	0.5
	Armenian	9.0		Moldavian	63.9	Uzbekistan	Uzbek	68.7
	Russian	7.4		Ukrainian	14.2		Russian	10.8
	Azerbaijani	5.1		Russian	12.8		Tatar	4.2
	Ossetian	3.3		Gagauzi	3.5		Kazakh	4.0
	Abkhazian	1.7		Jewish	2.0		Tajik	3.9
				Bulgarian	2.0		Karakalpak	1.9

Source: Michael Mandelbaum, ed., *The Rise of Nations in the Soviet Union* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1991), p. 103.

*Plus more than 100 other nationalities.

Figures do not add up to 100 percent because of rounding and because some small ethnic populations are not included.

date became a catalyst for declaring independence two years later, on April 9, 1991.

One month after the breakup of the Georgian demonstrations, the newly elected Congress of People's Deputies held its first session. The new Congress and the Supreme Soviet did not provide miraculous solutions for the Soviet Union's economic problems or shore up Gorbachev's seriously eroding political power base. The Congress proved to be neither an effective legislative body nor a popularly elected rubber stamp for the Kremlin leadership.

In June 1989, as the first Congress session drew to a close, fighting broke out between Uzbeks and Meshketians in Uzbekistan's densely populated Fergana Valley. The fighting stemmed from rumors, which had begun to circulate in the spring, that the Meshketians, who had been deported to the area as a "suspect" people during World War II, would be awarded homesteads and sent back to the north Caucasus. These rumors infuriated local Uzbeks, many of whom were unemployed and living in overcrowded conditions.

Official accounts said the fighting broke out over the

cost of a basket of strawberries. Whatever the cause, Uzbek youths turned on the Meshketians. Within days whole Meshketian settlements had been razed and nearly 100 people had been killed. Official reports maintained that local authorities who tried to suppress the rioters became the next target. Police stations and local party headquarters were severely damaged. Uzbekistan's party organization—already racked by the dismissals of officials implicated in a scandal involving the annual theft of much of the republic's cotton crop—was left to restore order in the republic.

The ugly side of political spontaneity manifested itself repeatedly during the summer of 1989. While cleanup operations were still proceeding in the Fergana Valley, fighting erupted between Kazakhs and migrant north Caucasian workers in the Kazakh republic town of Novy Uzen. Less than a month later there were riots in Sukhumi between Georgians and local Abkhazians who wanted to sever their ties with Georgia.

These outbursts helped strengthen the position of law-and-order proponents in the Communist party who claimed that they, not the new "democrats," could best protect the public. While party diehards tried to

limit the influence of their critics, popular front groups formally opposed to Communist party rule began to attract large memberships.

In September 1989 the Communist party finally convened a long-awaited special meeting on nationality problems at which the party seemed united in its impotence. Gorbachev offered the increasingly rebellious republics only vague promises of an unspecified form of political sovereignty and warned that these new powers would have to be exercised to fully protect the rights of national minorities.

THE SIEGE OF BAKU

Near the end of 1989, it was obvious that the political status quo could not survive much longer. Along with the nationalities problem and independence movements, Gorbachev now faced a nearly nationwide miners strike. To end the strike, Gorbachev promised that popular elections for local and republic legislatures would be held by the spring of 1990.

On January 19, 1990, in the midst of the election campaign, Baku was placed under martial law. The decision followed several months of demonstrations after the Azerbaijani government had again received control of Nagorno-Karabakh from the Gorbachev-appointed "special commission" that had administered the region since early 1988.

When the transfer occurred, there were immediate protests by Armenians that grew in intensity. Encouraged by the Popular Front, Azerbaijanis countered with their own demonstrations, filling Baku's main square and demanding the resignation of the local party bureau and the appointment of a sovereign Azerbaijani regime. The party-led government of the republic, headed by an unpopular and ineffective political reformer, lacked public support; the Popular Front thus appeared likely to win control of parliament in upcoming republic elections.

However, in mid-January, alongside the peaceful demonstrations, Azerbaijanis in Baku began attacks on the city's by now small Armenian population. Determined to keep Soviet troops out of Baku, the Popular Front managed to restore an uneasy peace. The front maintains that the city was relatively tranquil when martial law was declared. But within hours of the declaration, tanks rolled into Baku to drive demonstrators from the city's main square. More than 90 civilians—most of them unarmed—were killed during the recapture of the city. Despite countless eyewitness reports to the contrary, official Soviet government statements have consistently justified the use of force as necessary to restore order and protect unarmed civilians.

During the first days of the Red Army occupation,

chairman of the republic Council of Ministers Ayaz Mutaibov was appointed to replace disgraced first party secretary Abdul-Rahman Vezirov. In Azerbaijan, as in the other republics, the first secretary also became president. Mutaibov slowly acquired popular support, aided in part by the popularity of his own successor as chairman, Gasan Gasanov. Baku, however, remained under martial law until April 1991.

THE BALTIC REVOLT

The siege of Baku greatly influenced Lithuanian president Vytautas Landsbergis, who saw the attack as a warning of what half-steps toward independence might produce in Lithuania.⁶ After the Lithuanian Communists voted to sever all ties with the central party in December 1989, a collision was bound to occur. Algirdas Brazauskas, who was now both party leader and chairman of the republic parliament (Sejm), saw the break with Moscow as necessary to preserve the credibility of the Communist party.

But Brazauskas failed to convince Gorbachev of this when the two men met in December and January. Gorbachev traveled to Lithuania, but returned undeterred in his commitment to preserve the nation's unity and the Communist party's primacy. Gorbachev recognized that the party had to carve out a new role for itself and expected that the popular elections he had promised for the spring of 1990 would rejuvenate the republic and central governments. But once again Gorbachev's plans went seriously awry.

Lithuania was one of the first republics to hold its parliamentary election. Candidates endorsed by Sajudis, a mass organization formed in 1988 that supported Lithuanian independence, easily won a two-thirds majority. Until the very last minute Gorbachev thought that the Lithuanians were bluffing about independence. On March 8, 1990, two days before the newly elected parliament met for the first time, Gorbachev offered Brazauskas one last concession: a promise of confederate status for Lithuania, a form of semi-independence that would be introduced at an unspecified future date.

Since Gorbachev had recently demanded that the Supreme Soviet create the office of president, which gave him sweeping new powers, and pass a harsh law on republic secession, Lithuania's new leaders believed they should quickly proceed with their plans. On March 11, 1990, Lithuania's Sejm voted to restore the republic's independent statehood.

Gorbachev countered by demanding that Lithuania obtain its independence through "lawful" means—by adhering to procedures enacted by the Supreme Soviet on April 25. Thus until Lithuania rescinded its March 11 declaration, Gorbachev said, there could be no negotiations between Moscow and Vilnius.

A campaign of intimidation was quickly organized.

⁶Author's interview with Vytautas Landsbergis, Vilnius, February 1990.

Soviet garrison commanders in the Baltics staged tank "drills" in Vilnius, and planes dropped pamphlets attacking the Landsbergis government and warning that Soviet law would be enforced. The Baltic military district quickly made good on this promise by entering a Vilnius hospital and beating up young Lithuanian nationals who were resisting induction into the Soviet army as a protest against Soviet rule.

Gorbachev soon grew impatient and began to threaten direct military action to crush the Lithuanian government. However, mindful of international public opinion, the Soviet president instead established an economic blockade of the republic, cutting off oil and gas supplies. But Gorbachev's actions backfired again. The Lithuanians rallied behind Landsbergis with the spirit of a war-besieged people, and new democrats throughout the Soviet Union accepted the plight of the Lithuanians as their own. The Latvians and Estonians, who had passed their own declarations of independence, joined the Lithuanians in an economic union. Georgians shipped medicines, the Moscow and Leningrad city councils promised to trade meat for Lithuanian manufactured goods, and Byelorussians and Ukrainians trucked in black market gasoline across the border.

THE RUSSIAN REVOLT

The center of political protest moved to the Russian republic. The Russians, who had seen other nationalities demonstrate for two years, were no longer fearful of asserting their own nationalism. The discontented increasingly began to identify with a single opposition leader, Boris Yeltsin. In May 1990 the country watched Yeltsin struggle and win control of Russia's new parliament over the combined opposition of Gorbachev, professional party functionaries, and the leadership of the new Communist party of Russia. Yeltsin promised that if he won, Russia would be freed from central government control. On June 12, 1990, the newly elected Russian Congress declared the republic's sovereignty.

Yeltsin's ascendancy posed a potential threat to the Communist leaders who led the other Soviet republics. Only Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia were headed by non-Communists. The remaining republic leaders were Gorbachev loyalists.⁷ The Soviet president needed to find a way to help these men survive politically and retain their loyalty. Moreover, he needed to do so quickly, before the twenty-eighth party congress in July.

Gorbachev feared that what was initially planned as a victory celebration for reform-minded Communists would turn into an opportunity to repudiate his leadership or, worse yet, irrevocably splinter the party. So

within days of Yeltsin's election, Gorbachev became a proponent of republic sovereignty. The leaders of the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan all reversed their earlier positions and also became vigorous champions of republic autonomy.

The Soviet president called for a new union treaty, which would delineate the powers of the central government and the republics. Having helped insulate the republic party leaders from their outspoken nationalist opponents, he wanted to retain some power over how they would exercise their increased new authority.

Gorbachev maintained control of the party at the congress in July, but at a price. Yeltsin and several other prominent reformers quit the party, and the hard-line Communists in the party—men like Soyuz (Union) faction leader Colonel Viktor Alksnis—pressed Gorbachev to crack down on pro-secession nationalists.

The Soviet leader's political problems intensified throughout the summer. Moscow and the Baltic republics were unable to start formal negotiations. Communists were roundly defeated in elections in Armenia and fought for their political survival in Georgia. Moldavia was on the verge of splitting into three parts: pro-independence Moldova, pro-union "Pri-Dnestra," and pro-autonomy (but within the union) Gagauzia. Even longtime allies like Kazakhstan's Nursultan Nazarbayev and the Ukraine's president, Leonid Kravchuk, called for real autonomy for their republics as they struggled to make the transition from Moscow-designated to popularly supported leaders.

By fall 1990 the economy had ground to a halt, and Gorbachev was trapped between republics pressing for the right to solve their own economic problems and economists from both the "right" and the "left" arguing that economic reform had to preserve the economic unity of the nation. Early drafts of the union treaty, published in November 1990, were met with little enthusiasm in most of the republics.

Gorbachev slowly began to reassert control over the rebellious republics. He warned them that violations of Soviet financial, trade, and customs laws would no longer be tolerated, and that minority rights would be defended. To prove his seriousness, Gorbachev named hard-liner Boris Pugo to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Pugo, a Latvian and former senior KGB official, strengthened the special forces that were stationed in the seven most disruptive republics.

When the Congress of People's Deputies convened in December 1990, many speakers objected to Gorbachev's new hard line. But the most dramatic address was delivered by Eduard Shevardnadze, who resigned during the congress session as minister of foreign affairs, partly to protest what he feared was the impending return of totalitarian rule.

Despite its rhetoric to the contrary, the Congress con-

⁷In Moldavia, Mircha Snegur resigned from the Communist party after he was elected to preside over Moldavia's parliament.

tinued to support Gorbachev's basic position that the laws of the union were to be upheld. This was true even after January 13, 1991, when Soviet special forces seized Vilnius' television transmission tower after it had been taken over by Lithuanian nationalists. Fourteen civilians were killed during the attack.

For weeks a self-appointed Lithuanian Committee of National Salvation had been demanding the right to restore "Soviet law and order" to the republic, with the obvious support of local military officials. Pro-Moscow Communist party of Lithuania leaders publicly boasted that the "fascists" in power would soon be overthrown. The Vilnius government vowed to defend itself, and Lithuania's small national guard, bolstered by hundreds of volunteers, prepared for an attack on the Sejm. Barricades were erected inside and outside the building, and armed guards were stationed, but the parliament never came under direct attack.

Gorbachev claimed he had no advance knowledge of the attack on the television tower in Vilnius. In June 1991 the public prosecutor's office in Moscow ruled that the troops that attacked the tower had fired in self-defense.

YELTSIN'S ATTACKS ON GORBACHEV

Gorbachev, whose actions had long angered reformers, now antagonized the hard-liners by balking at escalating the use of force to break the anti-union governments. Yeltsin sensed Gorbachev's weakness and tried to persuade republic leaders Nazarbayev and Kravchuk and the mayors of Moscow and Leningrad to join his call for a Polish-style "Round Table" government. But rather than just working behind the scenes Yeltsin went public in mid-February 1991, demanding in a nationally televised interview that Gorbachev resign.

Yeltsin underestimated Gorbachev's political cunning. The Soviet president retaliated with a well-orchestrated attack on Yeltsin's own political leadership, staged by pro-party Russian republic deputies, with strong support in the central newspapers and on television. Yeltsin's critics in the Russian Supreme Soviet scheduled a special session of the republic's Congress of People's Deputies to debate Yeltsin's fitness to rule as chairman and if possible to vote him out of office.

Politicking was heavy throughout March. Yeltsin's supporters engaged in backstage maneuvers to prevent his defeat. At the same time, Gorbachev fought for passage of an imprecisely worded nationwide referendum endorsing the preservation of the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev won a partial victory. Only nine republics

participated in the March 17, 1991, voting. The Baltic republics had held their own referendums earlier in the year, with overwhelming majorities passing resolutions calling for complete independence. In Kazakhstan and the Ukraine, voters were asked whether to continue the union on the republics' own terms. Voters in the western Ukraine, an area dominated by Rukh, the Popular Movement for Restructuring, also passed a referendum calling for an independent Ukraine. In the Russian republic, voters simultaneously endorsed Gorbachev's referendum and Yeltsin's call for a popularly elected president of the Russian republic.

Yeltsin's supporters defied a ban on demonstrations Gorbachev had imposed for the duration of the session of the Congress, and rallied in Moscow. Yeltsin, for his part, was in firm control of the extraordinary session of the Russian Congress of People's Deputies that convened on March 28, 1991. He not only retained his post but successfully pressed the Congress to authorize the popular election of the republic's president.

Fierce enemies in February, Gorbachev and Yeltsin signed an agreement in April to strive toward a new union of sovereign republics that had been accepted by the leaders of nine republics. The republic leaders agreed to draw up a new version of the union treaty that would accord real sovereignty to the republics. Moreover, they implicitly recognized the right of Armenia, Georgia, Moldavia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia to negotiate their way out of the union.

However, it immediately became apparent that the central government had not had a complete change of heart with regard to the secessionist republics. For nearly two years Azerbaijani officials had been requesting permission to "clean out" villages—that is, to seize illegal arms caches and deport a potentially seditious population of unregistered Armenians. On April 24, one day after signing the agreement leading toward a union of sovereign republics, Azerbaijan's president promised to defend his republic's border from the Armenians.⁸

Less than one week later Soviet special forces stationed in Azerbaijan, supported by local forces, were authorized to carry out passport checks in Armenian villages in Nagorno-Karabakh and just inside the republic's border. These "checks" were actually deportation raids. Armenians who refused to sign voluntary requests for "relocation" were forcibly removed across the border. The Armenians retaliated and fighting broke out along much of the border between Armenian "irregulars" and pro-Azerbaijani secret forces, with casualties on both sides. The fighting remained sporadic throughout the summer of 1991.

The Baltic republics were sent their own message. In mid-May, Soviet special forces and small detachments from the Baltic garrison began destroying border posts erected by Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian customs

⁸On July 16, 1991, *Nezavisimy gazeta* reported that there was a secret deal between Gorbachev and Azerbaijan's president, Ayaz Mutalibov, on Azerbaijan's right to defend its position along the border with Armenia.

authorities. In the course of these attacks, most of which were in Lithuania, several Baltic border guards were killed or severely beaten. Local Soviet military officials justified these actions as necessary to enforce Soviet law.

SOVIET DISUNION

The agreement between Gorbachev and the republic leaders created as many problems as it solved. The leaders of the nine "loyalist" republics, all but one of whom were Communist party officials, remain political realists.⁹ By imitating sovereign bodies (by laying claim to their republics' wealth and pursuing direct foreign ties) they persuaded Gorbachev to grant the republics a real measure of independence.

But Gorbachev wanted to preserve the Soviet Union. The new version of the union treaty, published in late June 1991, still restricted the rights of the republics, which were pressed to pursue common financial, trade, and defense policies, and whose laws may still be superseded by the central government. Later changes to the treaty awarded the republics the right to levy taxes, and made them responsible for turning over a fixed percentage of the revenue to the central government.

Gorbachev planned to have the union treaty signed in August 1991, a new constitution to be drafted and ratified, and a new union government elected by the summer of 1992. But on August 19, hard-liners in the Kremlin staged a coup to prevent the signing of the treaty, which they feared would dismantle the central government and lead to the union's eventual dissolution.

⁹Askar Akayev, president of Kirghizia, is the only Central Asian president who did not also head the republic party organization.

The coup failed, in large part because of Boris Yeltsin's popularity. Yeltsin defiantly countered the orders of the eight men who had seized control of the Soviet government, issuing his own decrees from the Russian parliament building.

Gorbachev was restored to power after three days, but he was unable to resuscitate the Soviet government. On August 23 he dismissed the Council of Ministers for collusion. The next day he resigned as Communist party general secretary and announced sharp restrictions on party activities throughout the Soviet Union.

The rout of the party gave new hope to those demanding national independence. Russia granted the Baltic republics recognition on September 6, and several foreign governments, including the United States, said they would also recognize the independence of the Baltics. In the days after the coup, the Ukrainian parliament voted for independence, as did the Byelorussian parliament. Moldavia, Georgia, and Armenia are also expected to make more formal efforts to secede, and other republics may join them.

It is unclear whether these bids for independence will succeed. Regardless of their outcome, the Soviet Union's political leaders must devise a new constitution to regulate the country's competing political interests—one that will satisfy the political ambitions of both Gorbachev and Yeltsin. The new constitution must also meet with the approval of the remaining republic presidents, each of whom seeks guarantees that his republic's newly acquired sovereignty will not be rendered meaningless by Russia's exercise of its new powers. This would be a formidable task for even the most experienced constitutional lawmakers. It may be an impossible one for the Soviet Union's new democrats. ■

BOOK REVIEWS

ON THE SOVIET UNION

Restructuring the Soviet Economy: In Search of the Market

By Nicolas Spulber. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991. 328 pp., \$39.50.

With all the airy talk about reforming the Soviet economy through an anti-crisis plan, a 500-day plan, a presidential plan, and on and on, specific economic adjustments have been only vaguely hinted at. Boris Yeltsin and other Soviet leaders would do better to read Spulber's analysis of sectoral reforms and the restructuring of economic decision making in agriculture, manufacturing, and trade. Spulber examines the problems of transforming the economy and the need to leave behind Gorbachev's "neither fish nor fowl" attempt to introduce markets by half-measures.

In his introduction, Spulber says that the failure of the Soviet economy and the collapse of the Soviet Union's client states in Eastern Europe "cannot be fully understood without a patient, methodic, and detailed inventory and analysis of the specific courses of action and of the instruments devised and used by the Communist rulers in the pursuit of the elusive goal of directing and controlling all aspects of economic activity." This "patient, methodic, and detailed inventory and analysis" constitutes the bulk of his narrative, from the basic principles underpinning central planning to his discussion of the problems of reverting to a market economy.

Spulber confirms Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises' 1922 observation that socialization of the means of production precludes rational economic calculation and he shows why it will take more than 500 days to fix what never worked in the first place.

Debra E. Soled

A Biographical Directory of 100 Leading Soviet Officials

Compiled by Alexander Rahr. Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1991. 210 pp., \$42.85.

This is a useful who's who of the most important Soviet officials in office through the summer of 1990. The book contains a listing of each official's government and party positions and political activities, as well as photographic portraits for many. This last is not to be discounted, for with the flurry of new personalities who have become prominent since 1985, it has often been difficult to remember who some of these "gray" bureaucrats are if one cannot attach a name to a face.

In spite of the upheavals that have made many of the

100 individuals (only a handful of whom are women) profiled here obsolete, the selection includes several whose early careers remain of interest, such as Boris Yeltsin (here spelled El'tsin), Ivan Silayev, Abel Aganbegyan, Eduard Shevardnadze, and Anatoly Sobchak; also worth reading are the biographies of discredited coup leaders Dimitri Yazov, Boris Pugo, and Vladimir Kryuchkov.

Most of the members of this "rogues gallery" will be relegated to the history books. It would be interesting to see an updated version of this reference book at this time next year, to check if any of them are even mentioned.

D. E. S.

Ko-ops: The Rebirth of Entrepreneurship in the Soviet Union

By Anthony Jones and William Mosko. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991. 176 pp., \$29.95, cloth; \$12.95, paper.

Ko-ops provides a snapshot of the process of transforming the Soviet economy from a planned, state-owned system to a market economy. It traces the history of Soviet cooperative enterprises from 1987 to 1990, describing official and local attitudes, crime and the new opportunities for corruption, and legal restrictions.

Of all the barriers to economic transformation, however, the most serious is the public's resistance. Cooperatives have been legalized and publicized as one of the bases of a market economy, but popular suspicion of private enterprise and fear of ventures that do not rely on the bureaucratic safety net have thus far hindered the expansion of cooperative enterprises. The authors seem confident that as new managerial skills develop, and as consumers realize the benefits of a privatized economy, cooperatives will gain a greater foothold. This portrait shows their birth and tentative first steps while the economy was collapsing around them.

D. E. S.

Russia's Women: Accommodation, Resistance, Transformation

Edited by Barbara Evans Clements, Barbara Alpern Engle, and Christine D. Worobec. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991. 300 pp., \$45.00, cloth; \$14.95, paper.

Among all the groups in the Soviet Union, women have been worst served by the various social revolutions. In *Russia's Women*, the history of the treatment of women is traced from medieval times through the late

twentieth century in chapters on topics such as World War I, abortion and the impact of canon law.

The Bolsheviks recognized how traditional culture had oppressed women and led them to adapt themselves to a secondary social status; but socialism did less to liberate women and elevate their status than it did to introduce new sources of oppression. The essay on Soviet political iconography in particular shows how the cause of women's liberation was co-opted by the Communist party. On the assumption that merely declaring women's equality with men made it a fact, the party disbanded organizations devoted to advancing women's special interests, arguing that they were unnecessary. Women were lured into the workplace because of the country's economic needs, but no attempt was made by the party or the government to equalize the burden at home.

In spite of the lopsided "liberation" offered by the new Soviet society, feminism did not win much support. But with the lid now lifted on constructing a post-Communist society, the time has come for Russia's women to reconsider their long history of "accommodation" to men's interests.

D. E. S.

Foreign Policies of the Soviet Union

By Richard F. Staar. Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Institution Press, 1991. 351 pp., \$18.95, paper.

Richard F. Staar, who edits the *Yearbook of International Communist Affairs*, assesses Soviet foreign policy in light of the changes in Europe, the new relationship with the United States, and the Soviet Union's loss of influence in the third world. President Mikhail Gorbachev took control of foreign policy away from the party and vested it in his presidential council. This made possible the "new thinking" that led to the collapse of Communism in former Soviet client states in Europe. With the exception of the chapter on relations with the United States, events have outpaced the book's discussions of policies toward Europe and the restructuring of foreign policy decision making, especially the use of Soviet front organizations and propaganda. Still, the foreign policy structures Staar examines are worth understanding, since there is not yet anything to replace them.

D. E. S.

Soviet Social Problems

Edited by Anthony Jones, Walter D. Connor, and David E. Powell. Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1991. 337 pp., \$52.00, cloth; \$19.95, paper.

A book describing social problems that Soviet leaders until recently denied was not possible until the introduction of glasnost. In the last few years, the Soviet press has begun to cover issues like pollution, crime, drug abuse, the failings of the health care system, and education, and non-Soviet researchers have finally been able to do so as well.

Taking advantage of the new openness, the contributors to this volume provide a revealing look at modern Soviet society: David Powell addresses how well the Soviet Union treats its elderly; Marshall Goldman discusses the consequences of pollution and the nascent environmentalist movement; Loren Graham observes Soviet citizens' adaptation to new technology; and Richard Dobson writes on the problems of Soviet youth. What is most striking about their descriptions is how familiar they are: far from producing a "new society," socialism in the Soviet Union has led to the emergence of social problems all too similar to those in the West, and has proved no better at solving them.

D. E. S.

Soviet Foreign Economic Policy under Perestroika

By Leonard Geron. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1990. 144 pp., \$14.95, paper.

In this slim volume, Geron offers an overview of the structure and patterns of Soviet foreign economic policy, focusing on the period since 1986. Although other treatments undoubtedly give a fuller discussion of Soviet imports and exports, the institutional mechanisms, and Soviet participation in international organizations, Geron's work provides useful historical background and details on the results of changing economic policies up to 1990.

D. E. S.

Milestones in Glasnost and Perestroika

2 volumes. Edited by Ed A. Hewett and Victor H. Winston. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1991. \$38.95, cloth; \$16.95, paper.

This indispensable collection of essays offers a comprehensive assessment of the profound political changes that have swept across the Soviet Union under Gorbachev. Charting the course of glasnost and perestroika, the authors—leading American, British, and Soviet analysts—make sense of the dizzying pace of change in the Soviet Union by placing Gorbachev and his reforms in historical context.

William W. Finan, Jr.

ALSO RECEIVED

Perestroika from Below: Social Movements in the Soviet Union

Edited by Judith B. Sedaitis and Jim Butterfield. Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1991. 220 pp., \$34.50, paper.

The Rise of Nations in the Soviet Union: American Foreign Policy and the Disintegration of the USSR

Edited by Michael Mandelbaum. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991. 128 pp., \$14.95, paper.

The History of Siberia: From Russian Conquest to Revolution

Edited by Alan Wood. New York: Routledge, 1991. 192 pp., \$49.95.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

AUGUST 1991

INTERNATIONAL

European Community (EC)

(See also *Yugoslavia*)

Aug. 20—At an emergency meeting in The Hague, the EC freezes more than \$1 billion in economic aid to the Soviet Union in response to yesterday's coup against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.

Aug. 27—The EC grants the Soviet republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania unconditional recognition as independent countries.

International Terrorism

Aug. 8—Islamic Jihad (Holy War), a militant Shiite Muslim group in Lebanon, releases into the custody of Syrian officials British television journalist John McCarthy, whom it had held hostage since 1986.

A few hours after McCarthy's release, a previously unknown group calling itself the Organization for the Defense of the Prisoners' Rights announces that it has kidnapped relief agency administrator Jérôme Leyraud in Beirut; the group says it will kill Leyraud if more Western hostages are freed before Israel agrees to release Arabs captured in Lebanon.

Aug. 11—In West Beirut, Leyraud is released by his captors.

American hostage Edward Austin Tracy, kidnapped in Beirut in 1986 by the Revolutionary Justice Organization, is handed over to Syrian officials in the Lebanese capital; in Kennebunkport, Maine, US President George Bush thanks Iran, Syria, and Lebanon for helping to secure Tracy's release. Ten Western hostages remain in Lebanon.

Aug. 12—The text of a letter from Islamic Jihad delivered by former captive McCarthy to United Nations (UN) Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar in England yesterday is made public; the group says it will free the 2 remaining Western hostages it is holding after the release of "our freedom fighters from prisons in occupied Palestine and Europe."

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

(See also *US, Foreign Policy*)

Aug. 6—In Tunis, PLO chairman Yasir Arafat says that he must select Palestinian delegates to the Middle East peace conference the US is planning to cosponsor with the Soviet Union in October or no Palestinians will attend.

United Nations (UN)

(See also *Intl, International Terrorism; Cambodia; Morocco*)

Aug. 15—The Security Council votes, 13 to 1 with 1 abstention, to allow Iraq to sell oil worth as much as \$1.6 billion; revenues would go into an escrow account administered by the UN, which would buy food and medicine and distribute them in Iraq. A second resolution, approved unanimously, sets aside as much as 30 percent

of Iraq's oil earnings for war reparations and for UN expenses for monitoring the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border.

Aug. 28—In a report released today, Pérez de Cuéllar says that the UN Program of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development, begun in 1986, has failed and that conditions in Africa are now even worse; he proposes that donor nations forgive or help retire the continent's debt, which totals \$270 billion.

ALBANIA

(See *Italy*)

BULGARIA

Aug. 18—For a 5th day, more than 21,000 miners near the city of Madan strike, demanding that the government improve working conditions, raise salaries, and pledge not to close mines in the area; the strike affects 81 of Bulgaria's 90 mines.

CAMBODIA

Aug. 6—Thai government officials say that Pol Pot, who was Cambodia's leader during the Khmer Rouge's rule in the late 1970s, secretly directed the Khmer Rouge in June peace talks in Pattaya, Thailand, with the Cambodian government and the two other Cambodian guerrilla groups.

Aug. 27—In Pattaya, the 4 parties to the current round of peace talks agree to disband 70% of their military forces and to place the remainder under UN supervision.

CANADA

(See also *US, Foreign Policy*)

Aug. 6—Ontario's government formally recognizes that Native Americans in Ontario have the right to self-government; Ontario is the 1st province to acknowledge this right.

CHINA

Aug. 10—After talks in Beijing between Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng and Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu, China announces that it has decided to sign the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

DENMARK

(See *USSR*)

ETHIOPIA

Aug. 17—The government agrees to allow Israel to transport the remaining 2,600 Ethiopian Jews to Israel over the next 3 months; 14,000 Ethiopian Jews were airlifted to Israel in May.

FINLAND

(See *USSR*)

FRANCE(See also *Lebanon*)

Aug. 8—Shahpur Bakhtiar, who served as Iran's last prime minister before the 1979 Islamic revolution and who has been living in exile since then, is found stabbed to death outside his home in Paris.

GERMANY(See also *Yugoslavia*)

Aug. 17—The remains of Frederick the Great and his father, Frederick Wilhelm I, which were removed from a Hohenzollern castle in southern Germany yesterday, are reinterred in Potsdam; Chancellor Helmut Kohl attends the ceremony.

INDIA

Aug. 20—Sivarasān, who was suspected of planning the assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on May 21, commits suicide along with 6 confederates shortly before police surround their hideout in Bangalore; Sivarasān was an organizer and assassin for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, a rebel Tamil military force based in Sri Lanka.

IRAN(See *Intl, International Terrorism; France; US, Political Scandal*)**IRAQ**(See *Intl, UN; Kuwait; Turkey; US, Legislation*)**ISRAEL**(See *Intl, International Terrorism; Ethiopia; US, Foreign Policy*)**ITALY**

Aug. 8—An estimated 18,000 Albanians arrive in Bari after running a blockade of Italian ships; the Italian government plans to return the refugees to Albania because it considers them economic migrants, not political refugees.

Aug. 9—Italian police and army units begin deporting the refugees to Albania.

JAPAN(See *China*)**KUWAIT**

Aug. 7—Allied officials in Kuwait City say the Iraqi military has violated the cease-fire agreement that ended the Persian Gulf war in March by making several raids into the demilitarized zone in Kuwait to retrieve weapons they had left behind.

Aug. 28—The government says Kuwaiti troops have repelled an effort by a group of armed Iraqis to infiltrate Bubiyan Island; it says 47 Iraqis were arrested.

LEBANON(See also *Intl, International Terrorism*)

Aug. 26—Parliament ratifies a general amnesty on war crimes committed during the 15-year civil war.

Aug. 29—Christian army commander General Michel Aoun leaves for France, after 10 months of taking refuge in the

French embassy; France has offered him asylum.

Lebanese President Elias Hrawi granted Aoun a special amnesty and safe passage out of Lebanon if he promised not to engage in anti-government activities.

MADAGASCAR

Aug. 10—Reuters reports that government troops fired on demonstrators at the presidential palace in Antananarivo today, killing at least 10 people and injuring 300; the demonstrators were demanding political reform and the resignation of President Didier Ratsiraka.

Aug. 12—Red Cross officials say that as many as 51 people have been killed in 2 days of anti-government protests; most businesses observe a general strike called for by the opposition.

Aug. 23—Reuters reports that Ratsiraka has asked his prime minister, Guy Willy Razanamasy, to form a new government and "install democracy."

Aug. 26—Razanamasy names a government.

MOROCCO

Aug. 7—Reuters reports that after a 2-year lull, Polisario guerrillas and Moroccan forces have resumed fighting in Western Sahara; this may jeopardize a UN cease-fire plan that is scheduled to take effect on September 6.

NORWAY(See *USSR*)**POLAND**

Aug. 31—After a 3-day standoff, the lower house of Parliament rejects the government's offer to resign, 211 to 114. Yesterday President Lech Walesa, the Senate, and several pro-Solidarity politicians called on the Parliament, which is dominated by former Communists, to give the government authority to issue economic decrees; many deputies have criticized the government's economic policies and refuse to approve the government's proposed spending cuts.

SOUTH AFRICA

Aug. 9—In Ventersdorp, 3 people are killed and at least 57 injured in clashes between police and members of the Afrikaner Resistance Movement (AWB), an extremist pro-apartheid group that opposes radical liberalization; the group was attempting to prevent a speech by President F. W. de Klerk.

SRI LANKA(See also *India*)

Aug. 3—Government troops end a 25-day rebel Tamil siege of the Elephant Pass army camp, during which several hundred people were killed.

Aug. 30—President Ranasinghe Premadasa suspends Parliament for one month, delaying debate on a motion to impeach him for abusing his authority.

SYRIA(See *Intl, International Terrorism*)**TOGO**

Aug. 28—Ending his 24 years of military rule, President

Gnassingbé Eyadéma surrenders authority to Kokoh Koffigoh, an interim prime minister selected by a national conference; Koffigoh will name a transitional government that will organize elections for June 1992.

TURKEY

Aug. 7—Turkish troops stage air and artillery attacks on northern Iraq to prevent Kurdish separatists from returning to Turkey; Turkish-based rebel Kurds have been fighting for a separate state since 1984.

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS (USSR)

(See also *Intl, EC; US, Foreign Policy*)

Aug. 1—US President George Bush, speaking before the Ukrainian parliament in Kiev after completing 2 days of meetings with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow, says the US will not choose sides between the Soviet government and republics seeking independence; he urges the republics to foster democracy to help revive the Soviet Union's economic and political system.

Aug. 15—Armenian residents of Nagorno-Karabakh, an Armenian enclave in Azerbaijan, take 8 Soviet Interior Ministry soldiers prisoner; yesterday they seized 33 soldiers; the Armenians are demanding the release of 16 Armenians detained during the last 3 months of civil unrest.

Aug. 16—Aleksandr N. Yakovlev, Gorbachev's former national security adviser, resigns from the Communist party and warns that party hard-liners are planning a coup d'état.

Aug. 19—An 8-member "State of Emergency Committee," led by Vice President Gennadi Yanayev and hard-line KGB and military officials, declares that Gorbachev has been removed from power "for health reasons," and enacts a 6-month state of emergency to "restore law and order." Gorbachev, in the Crimea on vacation, is prevented from returning to Moscow.

State radio announces that the signing of the new union treaty, which had been scheduled for tomorrow, will not take place; the treaty would have radically shifted power from the central government to the 9 republics that had agreed to sign it.

At the Russian republic parliament, Boris Yeltsin, the president of the republic, calls for a general strike and resistance to the coup. Outside the parliament building, more than 20,000 people protest Gorbachev's ouster and erect barricades as Russian republic troops surround the building.

Soviet army and Interior Ministry troops seize control in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, and warships blockade the harbor at Tallinn.

Aug. 20—In Moscow 3 people defying a curfew declared today are killed in clashes with Soviet military units outside the Russian parliament building; several military units defect to defend the Russian parliament, where more than 150,000 people are staging a continuous vigil.

In Leningrad tens of thousands of demonstrators protest the coup, and demonstrations are reported in the Ukraine and Moldavia.

The Estonian parliament unanimously approves a declaration of independence and announces that elections will be held in 1992.

Aug. 21—Soviet troops withdraw from the center of Moscow, and the coup leaders leave the city. The Congress of People's Deputies announces that the emergency committee has been disbanded. Gorbachev returns to Moscow and declares that he is "in full control of the situation."

Speaking before the Russian parliament, Yeltsin says that the Communist party was the "organizing and inspiring force" behind the coup; he issues decrees establishing Russia's economic sovereignty and taking control of central government agencies.

Soviet troops in the Baltics are ordered to return to their barracks.

Latvia's parliament declares the republic's independence.

Aug. 22—At a news conference, Gorbachev says that the coup demonstrated that he must accelerate the pace of reform; he says that the Communist party can still be purged of "reactionary forces" and transformed into a vehicle for reform. He praises Yeltsin for his actions during the coup and admits that he misjudged some of his appointees, who were among the coup leaders. Gorbachev warns against a "witch hunt" of all Communists, saying there were some in the rank and file who did not support the takeover.

Interior Minister Boris Pugo, one of the coup leaders, commits suicide. The other coup leaders, except Yanayev, who is hospitalized, have been arrested.

In Moscow, more than 50,000 people rally at the parliament building to praise Yeltsin. Moscow Mayor Gavriil Popov orders the suspension of all Communist party activities in the city pending investigation of the party's possible role in the coup.

In Riga, the Latvian parliament outlaws the Communist party.

Nursultan Nazarbayev, the president of Kazakhstan, resigns from the Politburo and orders party officials out of workplaces in the republic.

Aug. 23—Yeltsin orders the closing of *Pravda* and other Communist party newspapers, suspends all party activities in Russia, and seizes party property in the republic. The Moscow city council orders the sealing of all party buildings in Moscow.

Speaking before the Russian republic parliament, Gorbachev says the Soviet government must resign; after consultation with Yeltsin, he appoints replacements, including Yevgeny Shaposhnikov as defense minister, Vadim Bakatin as head of the KGB, and Viktor Barannikov as interior minister; republic lawmakers criticize Gorbachev's continued loyalty to the Communist party.

Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, who claims that illness prevented him from speaking out during the coup attempt, resigns as foreign minister after he is accused of disloyalty.

The Latvian parliament votes to ban the Communist party; republic party leader Alfred Rubiks is placed under arrest.

The Estonian government says all Communist party cells in workplaces in Estonia must be disbanded by September 1.

Kirghiz President Askar Akayev nationalizes his

republic's Communist party Central Committee building.

Kakhar Makhomov, Tajikistan's president, bans political party activities in republic ministries.

Nazarbayev bans all Communist, KGB, and Interior Ministry activities in Kazakhstan.

Moldavia and Georgia outlaw the Communist party and nationalize party property.

Lithuanian police in Vilnius seize the Communist party headquarters and regain control of buildings occupied by Soviet troops since January.

Aug. 24—Gorbachev resigns as general secretary of the Communist party, disbands the Central Committee, and orders the Council of Ministers to resign; he then forms a commission to take charge of the economy, to be headed by Ivan Silayev, the prime minister of the Russian republic. Gorbachev orders the Congress to take control of Communist party property and bans party activities in central government and security organs.

The parliament of the Ukraine declares the republic's independence and says a referendum will be held to ratify it December 1.

Yeltsin issues a decree sealing the archives of the military, the KGB, and the Interior Ministry. He formally recognizes Estonian and Latvian independence and urges Gorbachev to do the same; he had earlier recognized Lithuania's independence.

Aug. 25—Denmark, Norway, and Finland recognize the Baltic republics and announce their readiness to establish formal diplomatic relations.

The Byelorussian republic declares independence. Defense Minister Shaposhnikov says he will replace about 80% of the top military command.

A presidential spokesman announces that Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, a top military adviser to Gorbachev, committed suicide yesterday.

In Kiev the Ukrainian parliament votes to disband the Communist party in the republic and to seize the party's assets.

Aug. 26—At an emergency session of the Congress, Gorbachev urges the republics to agree to a new union treaty that will allow them greater autonomy. He promises elections for national offices, including president, 6 months after the union treaty is signed and says republics that still want to quit the union could negotiate their secession then. Gorbachev tells the Congress that he accepts some blame for the coup and offers to overhaul the KGB.

The Supreme Soviet votes to convene the Congress on September 2 to discuss the future of the union.

Anatoly Lukyanov resigns as chairman of the Congress; he denies charges that he planned the coup.

Russia says it will "review its borders" with adjacent republics other than the Baltics that want to secede; Russia also warns that it will not allow secessionist republics to take with them areas with large Russian populations.

Gorbachev names 8 new Cabinet members, all of them from the Russian republic.

Aug. 27—Gorbachev announces that the KGB will be scaled down and its military units integrated into the regular army.

The leaders of Russia, Kazakhstan, and Kirghizia agree to sign a new union treaty between the central

government and republics desiring to stay in the union. Gorbachev urges the Congress to negotiate a treaty and to define the relationship between the center and the republics. He says that if agreement on a new or modified union cannot be reached, he will resign.

The Moldavian parliament unanimously votes in favor of independence for the republic.

Aug. 28—Delegates from the Russian republic and Soviet parliaments travel to the Ukraine in an effort to persuade its leaders to stay in the union.

Gorbachev says that Yeltsin's decrees asserting control over central government institutions were legitimate during the coup, but that such actions are no longer acceptable; he says, "Everything must be based on the constitution, and... on cooperation."

Gorbachev appoints Boris Pankin to succeed Bessmertnykh as foreign minister.

Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis announces that the Soviet government will no longer draft Lithuanian youth and will release those now serving in the Soviet armed forces.

Aug. 29—The Congress votes, 283 to 29 with 52 abstentions, to suspend all Communist party activities in the Soviet Union until the party's role in the coup is investigated, but rejects the complete liquidation of the party.

Yeltsin says the central government must continue to exist, but reduced in size and with a smaller budget.

Gorbachev proposes that an expanded Security Council, which would include republic leaders, function as a transitional authority while the union is reorganized.

The Ukraine and Russia agree to interim arrangements that preserve some form of union in order to prevent the "uncontrolled disintegration" of the Soviet Union; the accord calls for setting up a collective security system, recognizing existing republic borders, and coordinating economic reform.

Pravda announces that it will reopen as an independent newspaper.

The Congress confirms Vadim Bakatin as KGB head.

Aug. 30—Russia and Kazakhstan reach an accord similar to the one Russia reached with the Ukraine yesterday.

Bakatin and Shaposhnikov, in separate statements, announce the reorganization of the KGB and defense forces; the KGB will no longer engage in political surveillance and the army will cease political activities.

The parliament of Azerbaijan votes unanimously to declare the republic's independence.

Aug. 31—Uzbekistan and Kirghizia declare independence. OMON (Special Militia Task Force) units withdraw from Latvia and Lithuania.

On the final day of an emergency session, the Supreme Soviet creates a 15-member commission to investigate the coup; the parliamentary body refuses commission membership to several prominent liberals, including Leningrad Mayor Anatoly Sobchak.

UNITED STATES (US)

Administration

Aug. 6—The US Attorney for Kansas, with Justice Department backing, files a brief in support of arguments by protesters demonstrating outside abortion clinics in Wichita, Kansas, that the Civil Rights Act of 1971 does not

apply to women seeking abortions; yesterday, Judge Patrick Kelly of the US district court in Wichita cited the act in ordering US marshals to guard 2 clinics; 2,000 demonstrators have been arrested since July 15.

Aug. 13—President George Bush nominates William Taylor, the chief banking regulator at the Federal Reserve Board, to replace L. William Seidman, who is resigning as chairman of both the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Resolution Trust Corporation, the agency managing the savings and loan industry bailout.

Aug. 15—Dick Thornburgh resigns as attorney general to run in a special election for senator from Pennsylvania.

Aug. 18—The Treasury Department suspends Salomon Brothers Inc., a Wall Street investment banking firm, from participation in Treasury auctions because of its late reporting of violations of bidding regulations; hours later, Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady reinstates the firm's right to trade for itself after requests from Salomon's new chairman, Warren Buffett.

Foreign Policy

(See also Intl, International Terrorism; USSR)

Aug. 1—After meeting in Jerusalem with Secretary of State James Baker 3d, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir tells reporters that Israel will attend a US- and Soviet-sponsored Middle East peace conference planned for October if the Palestinian delegation does not include Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) members, residents of East Jerusalem, or stateless Palestinians.

Aug. 2—In Jerusalem, Baker meets with Palestinian leaders Zakaria Agha, Hanan Ashrawi, and Faisal al-Husseini to discuss Palestinian participation in the Middle East peace conference.

Aug. 11—*The New York Times* reports the results of a study by the Congressional Research Service that found the US has surpassed the Soviet Union as the largest arms supplier to the third world, transferring weapons worth \$18.5 billion to third world countries in 1990, up from \$7.8 billion-worth in 1989.

Aug. 19—Responding to today's coup by hard-liners in the Soviet Union, President Bush says the US supports Russian republic president Boris Yeltsin's call for Mikhail Gorbachev's restoration as president of the Soviet Union; the US, Bush says, "will avoid in every possible way actions that will lend legitimacy or support" to the coup.

Aug. 22—In Kennebunkport, Maine, Bush announces that he has reinstated, after a 3-day freeze, US economic aid to the Soviet Union, which includes \$900 million in agricultural loan guarantees.

Aug. 26—At a press conference with Canadian President Brian Mulroney, who announces that Canada will establish full diplomatic relations with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, Bush says the US has "special responsibilities" not to destabilize the Soviet Union by granting recognition to the Baltic states too quickly.

Labor and Industry

Aug. 8—Testifying before a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee, Masihur Rahman, the former chief financial officer of the Luxembourg- and Abu Dhabi-based Bank of Credit and Commerce International

(BCCI), says the bank became insolvent in 1985 after sustaining \$430 million in trading losses, but concealed this through secret loans and insider trading in its own stock; the bank was seized last month by regulators from 7 countries.

Aug. 9—A US district court judge in Manhattan approves a \$2.1-billion settlement reached by bankrupt securities firm Drexel Burnham Lambert and its creditors that will remove Drexel as a defendant in future court actions brought against its former employees.

Aug. 12—The BankAmerica Corporation of San Francisco announces that it will acquire the Security Pacific Corporation of Los Angeles in a deal worth nearly \$4.5 billion, creating the second-largest bank in the US.

Aug. 13—Clark Clifford resigns as chairman of First American Bankshares Inc. of Washington, D.C.; he has told US and New York investigators he was unaware that the bank holding company was secretly owned by BCCI.

ECONOMIC INDICATORS August Reports

	Change from previous period	Total
Gross National Product 2nd quarter, 1991, Revised Figures 3rd consecutive quarter of decline	- 0.1%	\$4.12 trillion
Merchandise Trade Deficit June Lowest since June 1983	- 19%	\$4.02 billion
Consumer Price Index July	+ 0.2%	136.2 points
Unemployment July	- 0.2%	6.8% (8.5 million)
Leading Economic Indicators July Largest gain since June 1988	+1.2%	145.4 points
Dow Jones Industrial Average August 28 Record high	+ 29.07 points	3,055.23 points
Durable Goods Orders July Highest level since December 1970	+ 10.7%	\$129.9 billion

Sources: Commerce and Labor Department reports; news reports.

Legislation

Aug. 2—The House, voting 375 to 45, approves a \$5.8-billion extension of unemployment benefits for up to 20 weeks beyond the current basic 26 weeks of coverage; the Senate approved a similar measure by voice vote yesterday. Under the budget act passed last year, Bush would have to declare an "emergency" in order to free the funds, since they would add to the national deficit.

Voting 97 to 2, the Senate passes a binding resolution endorsing the use of "all necessary means" to eliminate Iraq's nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons capabilities; it passes another resolution in support of the use of military force if Iraq attacks the Kurds.

The Senate passes by voice vote a \$291-billion military budget bill for fiscal year 1992. In voting yesterday on amendments to the bill, the Senate approved \$4.6 billion for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and for the startup of one ground-based SDI site; the House last month approved \$3.5 billion for antimissile defense but prohibited space-based components; the administration had requested \$5.2 billion for SDI.

Aug. 15—Bush signs a bill that strengthens the requirement for written presidential notification to Congress of covert operations and that bans retroactive presidential approval of such operations; he vetoed a version of the bill last year.

Aug. 17—Bush signs the unemployment compensation-extension bill, but not the declaration of a budget emergency necessary to release the funds.

Military

Aug. 14—*The New York Times* reports that Defense Department investigations have determined that "friendly fire" from US forces was responsible for the deaths of 35 of the 148 US troops killed in action in the Persian Gulf war.

In a lawsuit in US district court in Cincinnati made public today, the General Electric Company is charged with conspiring to defraud the Defense Department of more than \$30 million through bogus sales and overcharging for military equipment and support services to Israel between 1985 and 1988; at an Israeli military trial in March, General Rami Dotan was sentenced to 13 years in prison on related charges.

Aug. 15—The Army announces that 2 of its 4 combat divisions in Europe, numbering about 71,000 soldiers, will be withdrawn beginning next year as part of major US troop reductions abroad.

Political Scandal

Aug. 5—Thomas Foley (D-Wash.), the Speaker of the House, and George Mitchell (D-Maine), the Senate minority leader, announce bipartisan investigations in the House and Senate into "persistent rumors" that officials of the 1980 Ronald Reagan-George Bush presidential campaign arranged for arms shipments to Iran in return for the delayed release of 52 American hostages in Teheran.

Science and Technology

Aug. 11—The space shuttle *Atlantis* lands at Kennedy Space Center in Cape Canaveral, Florida, after a 9-day mission; its crew deployed a \$120-million satellite to relay information from data-producing spacecraft.

VIETNAM

Aug. 9—Do Muoi resigns as prime minister; he is succeeded by Vo Van Kiet, who favors free-market economic reforms. Do Muoi remains Communist party secretary general.

Aug. 10—The National Assembly names a Cabinet that includes new ministers of defense, trade and interior, and

state planning, and a new deputy prime minister; Nguyen Manh Camh, the ambassador to the Soviet Union, succeeds Nguyen Co Thach as foreign minister.

WESTERN SAHARA

(See Morocco)

YUGOSLAVIA

Aug. 1—Croatian president Franjo Tudjman dismisses his defense minister and says that Croatia is militarily outmatched by rebel Serbian forces.

Aug. 3—*The New York Times* reports that as many as 80 police and national guardsmen were killed on August 1, in an unsuccessful attempt by Serbian rebels to retain control of 3 towns in eastern Croatia.

Tudjman meets in Zagreb with a European Community (EC) delegation in an attempt to negotiate a cease-fire between the Croats and the Serbians.

New clashes are reported shortly after the collective Yugoslav presidency approves an EC-negotiated cease-fire plan; the plan calls for federal police to oversee a truce among Serbian rebels, Croatian forces, and the federal army. The leader of the collective presidency, Stipe Mesic, votes against the plan, saying the federal army should be required to return to its barracks.

Aug. 4—The EC mission leaves Yugoslavia after the Serbian republic refuses to accept the cease-fire terms.

Aug. 6—Rebel Serbians in Croatia announce that they will stop fighting.

The New York Times reports that on August 4, unidentified attackers in Belgrade killed Branislav Matic, the second in command of the Serbian Renewal Movement, Serbian paramilitary group. The movement's leader, Vuk Draskovic, says he believes the Communist Serbian Government is responsible.

Aug. 18—Federal army tanks join Yugoslav troops massing near Okucani, Croatia, to help suppress clashes between Croats and Serbians. Yesterday federal army planes bombed Croatian positions in the area, and Mesic threatened to resign if the 2 ethnic groups did not reach a truce.

Aug. 20—For a 2d day, rebel Serbs fire on residential neighborhoods in Osijek, a Croatian-dominated town in eastern Croatia; 4 people are killed.

Aug. 22—Tudjman says Croatia will regard federal army troops as occupiers if they and Serbian rebels fail to surrender or honor a cease-fire declared on August 7. At least 19 people are reported killed in fighting in Croatia.

Aug. 25—German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher tells the Yugoslav federal government that Germany will consider recognizing the independence of Croatia and Slovenia if the fighting does not end soon; shortly afterward, violence breaks out again between Croatian militia and Serbian rebels in Croatia.

Aug. 26—In the heaviest fighting so far, federal army and rebel Serbian troops attack Croatian towns near Vukovar.

Aug. 31—Serbia says it will accept an EC peace plan that calls for international supervision of a cease-fire in Croatia. Croatia and the federal government have approved the plan, but the federal army has not yet announced its decision.

COMING IN NOVEMBER IN CURRENT HISTORY: THE NEW EUROPE

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